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ABSTRACT 
In 2014 The commercial space company, Scaled Composites, suffered a 
catastrophic event during a test flight, killing one astronaut. Several recommendations for 
the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
emerged from the National Transportation Safety Board. One recommendation was the 
introduction of a safety management system (SMS) as a safety protocol and became the 
genesis of this research project. This study has two purposes. The first purpose is to 
investigate whether the attributes of safety management system theory (SMST) exist in 
commercial space organizations. The second purpose is to explore the characteristics of 
high reliability theory (HRT) to determine whether they occur in SMS organizations in 
the airline industry. The attributes of HRT exist in some high-risk organizations. 
An exploratory, sequential, mixed-method study was performed using grounded 
theory and the Delphi methodology. A survey, the Organizational Safety Attribute 
Awareness Survey, was developed, combining the SMS theory-based survey with the 
HRT questions used in this study. Two demographic questions were used to determine 
whether one’s role in the organization or the length of time in the industry impacted 
perceptions of SMS and HRT attributes. 
Structural modeling produced an acceptable SMS survey model. Independent t-
test results between commercial space and airline participants show promising acceptance 
levels for three of the four SMST elements. Results showed that participants from the 
commercial space organization had higher mean values for the attributes of SMST. 
Further, results suggested similar outcomes with the characteristics of HRT in 
participants from the airline industry. The practical implications of this research are 
xvi 
twofold. First, understanding the degree of organizational members’ awareness of SMS 
attributes will allow for the focused implementation of the program with resources 
targeted to areas that require more attention. Second, by highlighting the recognition of 
HRT in an SMS environment, current safety awareness may be enhanced and include 
additional safety tools aimed at increasing overall organizational safety. 
Keywords: airline, commercial space, high reliability theory, mindfulness, safety 
management system, safety management system theory, safety culture. 
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The health and safety of the general public during private commercial space 
operations is a top priority for the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST). The FAA/AST also protects property and 
national-security interests, and encourages the private commercial space industry (FAA, 
2015a, p. 3). The FAA/AST works in concert with individual commercial space 
companies to formulate safety guidelines, identify safety risks, and codify standard 
practices for the industry. A key to future safety theory adoption may include 
understanding the degree to which organizational members recognize safety attributes. 
This information may help the industry adopt necessary adjustments to existing safety 
protocols. 
Space flight is inherently complex and risky, with little room for error. When 
discussing the potential of the FAA/AST implementation of a safety management system 
(SMS), Zee and Murray (2009) stated that “the future of the commercial human space 
flight industry will depend on its ability to continually improve its safety performance” 
(p. 5). During the last decade, few space-related accidents have occurred. Maintaining a 
high level of coordination between the FAA/AST and space companies will become more 
of a requirement to advance safety (FAA, 2015a; Zee & Murray, 2009). One possible 
future initiative may include the development of a universal commercial space SMS, the 
details of which were included in the 2015 FAA/AST Safety Management System 
Manual. 
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In 2014, SpaceShipTwo, operated by Scaled Composites, suffered a catastrophic 
inflight breakup during a test flight (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 
2015). The NTSB was tasked with an investigation and released their findings after its 
completion. Implementing an SMS was one recommendation. 
Seeing the success of the SMS and its various components in airlines, the 
FAA/AST formulated one type of safety program for space companies (FAA, 2015a). 
The latest version of their SMS document, edited in 2015, sets the foundation for private 
commercial space companies regarding safety culture (FAA, 2015a). Although not 
mandatory, an SMS program may become commonplace as more humans begin traveling 
into space. 
Wakimoto (2019) suggested that the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), along with other agencies, create a set of international safety standards for 
commercial space companies. Today, private commercial space companies have different 
vehicles, use proprietary launch/recovery procedures, use different fuel blends, and have 
specific orbital requirements predicated on operational necessities as the launch vehicles 
transition through the National Air Space (FAA, 2015a; Hays, Chu, & Llanos, 2019). 
Establishing uniformity of safety measures may be challenging for the FAA/AST to 
achieve until they begin to regulate the industry. However, common best practices and 
standard safety protocols are necessary (Chatzipanagiotis & Kyriakopoulos, 2019). 
Achieving safety uniformity will be a task the FAA/AST will need to develop and 
enforce in the future (FAA, 2015a; Zee & Murray, 2009). The public’s perception of 
safety in commercial space travel is dictated by the overall levels of safety of space 
flights. Space tourism will increase the public’s awareness when these flights become 
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routine, thereby increasing total space operations (Canis, 2016; Dickson, 2020; 
Whitesides, 2019). 
The FAA/AST is required to “encourage, facilitate, and promote US commercial 
space transportation” (FAA, 2015a, p. 1). The FAA/AST accomplishes these tasks 
through tight controls of risks to the sector. Figure 1 depicts a triangulation of risks used 
by the FAA/AST to illustrate a risk-management-mitigation model for public safety. 
 
Figure 1. Key elements of risk. 
Note. From Safety Management System for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 
Operations Certificate Holders; Final Rule, by Federal Aviation Administration, 2015a, 
Washington, DC, US: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Private Commercial Space 
To better understand the need for a universal SMS protocol requires an 
examination of the various aspects of the private commercial space industry. The 
following areas include topics of government-policy changes, private commercial space 
launches and recoveries, delivery of satellites into orbit, and supply missions to the 
International Space Station (ISS). The space-tourism sector is included in this discussion, 
given its potential for prodigious growth (Chang, 2015; Chang & Chern, 2016; Loizou, 
2006). 
4 
The development of the commercial space sector as a launch provider resulted 
from changes in federal policy (Canis, 2016; Chang, 2015; Kay, 1998).The passing of the 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 1984 (CSLCA) encouraged space 
operations and associated services by private-sector commercial space companies. The 
Act states that “the United States should encourage private sector launches, reentries, and 
associated services and, only to the extent necessary, regulate those launches, reentries, 
and services to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States” 
(CSLCA, 1984, p. 1.). The Act also began the advancement of a public–private 
partnership between the government and the private commercial space industry (George, 
2019). The CSLCA was amended in 2004 and 2015 (CSLCA 2004, 2015) extending the 
length of time in which selected FAA/AST regulation nonenforcement was to occur 
(Canis, 2016). By not regulating commercial space, companies have additional time for 
innovations (Chatzipanagiotis & Kyriakopoulos, 2019). This buffer allowed for 
augmentation of needed technology and a development period for the industry (Canis, 
2016). Necessary advancements with flights into orbit, including human space travel, 
continued (Canis, 2016; M. S. Smith, 2011). 
A shift toward an emphasis on private commercial space operations began in 
earnest during the presidency of Barack Obama. One of these policy adjustments 
included an increased dependence on the private commercial space industry’s 
development through government augmentation of a commercial-crew space-
transportation system aimed at carrying astronauts to and from low earth orbit (M. S. 
Smith, 2011). These adjustments allowed NASA to focus on sending astronauts and 
equipment to destinations beyond the earth’s orbit. Congress made further adjustments to 
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the proposed Obama space-policy changes, in part by crafting the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2010. The Act stated, in part, 
that the FAA administrator would develop strategies necessary to anticipate the needs of 
commercial space companies and offer any assistance needed to help augment the 
development of commercial space operations (NASA Authorization Act of 2010). 
Furthermore, the signing of the U.S. CSLCA of 2015 cultivated further changes in 
government space policy (Dodge, 2016). These changes aimed to strengthen or adjust the 
industry, along with parallel changes to government policy. During this time, Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) won a multiyear contract to perform 
launches for NASA (Jones, 2018; Ma, Xie, Liu, & Wu, 2019; M. S. Smith, 2011). Obama 
juxtaposed the immense opportunities of a space economy with the dire financial 
circumstances of the time, thus the shift to a public–private partnership (M. S. Smith, 
2011). Some in government were caught off guard and questioned whether the private 
sector would be up to the task of space operations. Ultimately, Congress voted to compel 
NASA to complete work on a new space-crew transportation system, as well as continue 
to support the commercial space industry (M. S. Smith, 2011). 
Commercial space companies have collaborated with NASA to augment space 
flights beginning in the 1950s (Dodge, 2016; Chatzipanagiotis & Kyriakopoulos, 2019). 
The increased growth was labeled “new space” and grew during the Bush and Obama 
presidencies (Denis et al., 2020). The economic decline following the financial recession 
in the early 2000s shifted the governmental focus toward fostering a vibrant private 
commercial space industry. The changes to the NASA budget resulted in the number of 
successful commercial space companies seen today. Forward-thinking presidents have 
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helped set in place and foster the seeds of commercial space (Morring, 2009). NASA was 
once aided by a few commercial space companies and now are the aid for the private 
companies (Denis et al., 2020). Launches today are monthly rather than annual events 
and are predicted to continue (Chang, 2015). 
The increase in the use of commercial space companies by NASA dates back to 
the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan began to explore the notion of commercial 
ventures helping NASA with space flights (Kay, 1998). Each president has advanced the 
growth of the commercial sector. President Obama funded the most amount of money, 
which spurred a rapid acceleration in commercial space growth (Obama, 2010; M. S. 
Smith, 2011). In 2014, NASA announced the concept of Launch America or commercial 
space taxi services as the next chapter in human spaceflight (Chang, 2015; M. S. Smith, 
2011). Chang (2015) further stated that NASA had invested billions of dollars into 
companies such as Boeing and SpaceX, tasked with resupply missions to the ISS. The 
ultimate goal of launching humans back into space from the United States’ soil (Chang, 
2015). Figure 2 highlights a timeline of significant space accomplishments. 
The number of commercial space companies that research, design, and operate 
their space vehicles for profit has grown in the last several years. These companies 
include launches into suborbit, launches to low earth orbit, mission to resupply the ISS, 
placing satellites into orbit, and soon, crewed flights to the Moon and beyond (Reddy, 
Nica, & Wilkes, 2012). The sector of space tourism alone has the potential to be a $700 
million market annually (Chen & Chen, 2014). In 2008, Astrium’s Chief Technology 
Officer Laine affirmed that public interest might create enough demand to exceed the 
Futron Corporation’s space-tourism market (Beard & Starzyk, 2002). The Futron 
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Corporation’s space-tourism-market study in 2002 was one of the first forecasts 
highlighting the potential of the commercial space-industry sector, with projected growth 
in the industry (Beard & Starzyk, 2002). The commercial space industry was estimated to 
become a multibillion industry by 2021 (Chang, 2015; Chang & Chern, 2018; Loizou, 
2006). In passing the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017, Congress signaled a 
growing interest in space flight by the private commercial space industry to the ISS. This 
act expanded the role of commercial space-operations support. It included the 
development of reliable ISS resupply-mission capabilities as well as transporting crew 
members into space, ending reliance on the Russian space program to accomplish these 
tasks. (NASA Transition Authorization Act, 2017).
 
Figure 2. Innovations in space. 
Note. Adapted from New Space to Big Space: How Commercial Space Dream is 
Becoming a Reality, by G. Denis et al., Acta Astronautica, 166, 431–443. https://doi.org 
/10.1016/j.actaastro.2019.08.031  
Historically, government-run space programs were the only means of flight into 
space. Today, SpaceX, Blue Origin, Bigelow, Virgin Galactic, ULA, and many more 
companies are vying for market share in the space-flight sector (Chandler, 2007; Chang, 
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2015; Chang & Chern, 2018). The new terms “NewSpace,” “alt.space,” and 
“entrepreneurial space” describe the newer entrants into space technology and travel 
(Denis et al., 2020; Martin, 2014). These descriptive labels include the actual commercial 
space organizations that conduct the launches (Davidian, 2019). Table 1 depicts the types 
of space activities in the commercial space industry. 
Table 1 
Private Commercial Space Opportunities 
Orbital Commercial Space Possibilities 
Tourist industry  Low earth orbit (LEO) (between 180–3000 km) 
High earth orbit (HEO)–Geocentric 35,786 km 
Short weightlessness flights 
Space Adventures: private citizens to ISS 
Research/Applications Conduct experiments continuously in the orbital 
environment (microgravity and life sciences) 
Launch small satellites from ISS 
Satellite servicing Launch small satellites from ISS 
Satellites, put them in proper orbits, refuel, fix, and upgrade 
systems 
Deep Space Commercial Space Opportunities 
Tourist/Explorers The Inspiration Mars Foundation 
Flights to the Moon 
Space research  Human Factors: to be productive and happy in deep space flight; 
in-space economy 
Mining and resource Use  Asteroid mining  
Servicing a space-based economy 
and settlements 




Note. ISS = International Space Station, adapted from NewSpace: The emerging commercial space 
industry, by G. Martin, 2014, Albuquerque, NM, US: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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Satellites 
The manufacturing cost of producing satellites has decreased in the last decade, as 
well as the costs of launching them into space (Canis, 2016; Denis et al., 2020). The 
lower costs needed to place a satellite into space resulted in a growth in the market 
(Canis, 2016). The NASA Transition Authorization Act (2017) described satellite 
commerce as launching those used for communication, earth observation, global 
atmospheric monitoring, transportation, and safety enhancement. In 2015, global satellite 
manufacturing revenues were $6 billion (Canis, 2016). Recent congressional acts have 
offered insulation to commercial space companies often applied to other budding 
industries by federal regulations (Canis, 2016). The Commercial Space Launch 
Amendment Act of 2004 lowered the barriers of entry into the market. This Act resulted 
in an increased number of satellite developers, encouraged by cheaper manufacturing 
costs and prices to launch devices into space. 
Advancements in satellite technology allow them to be made much smaller than 
previous satellites. Cube-structured satellites, or smaller weight satellites, comprise 126 
of a total of 262 satellites launched in 2015. These satellites are an industry standardized 
size and weigh under 22 pounds each (Canis, 2016). The design gives uniformity among 
manufactures and also allows the satellites to ride on existing rocket launches, thereby 
opening the market to new companies by lowering barriers to entry (Sweeting, 2018). 
The success of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launches had shown economic viability with reusable 
rockets, which, coupled with cheaper manufacturing costs, results in putting a satellite 
into space more efficiently feasible today (Denis et al., 2020). 
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Supply Missions 
SpaceX won a NASA contract to resupply materials to the ISS (Ma et al., 2019; 
M. S. Smith, 2011). Historically, the high cost to launch a kilogram into space was the 
limiting factor for space companies (Jones, 2018). SpaceX solved that issue with an 
economical reusable rocket manufactured inhouse, eliminating the need for outside 
contractors (Drenthe, Zandbergen, Curran, & Van Pelt, 2019). Although Blue Origin was 
the first company to have a reusable rocket (Chang, 2015), SpaceX was the first 
commercial space company to capitalize publicly on the business model and has made 
space flight profitable (Jones, 2018; Ma et al., 2019). 
SpaceX began a supply mission contract with NASA in 2012 (Jones, 2018). The 
savings derived from the use of reusable rocketry technology drove the cost to launch a 
kilogram into space down to a profitable level (Denis et al., 2020; Jones, 2019). Figure 3 
shows the reduction in costs to send a kilogram of material into space achieved by 
technological advancements using reusable rockets. The introduction of SpaceX’s Falcon 
9, in addition to the use of the Dragon autonomous cargo ship, reduced the space shuttle 
cost to ISS by approximately a factor of four (Jones, 2018). 
Space Tourism 
In 2004, Scaled Composites, with Mike Melvill flying the space vehicle, became 
the first commercial space company to fly into space with a reusable craft called 
SpaceShipOne and won the Ansari X-prize (Chang 2015). This flight ushered in the 
concept of new space tourism. Space tourism started a decade ago with flights to the ISS, 
and a total of seven tourists made the journey (Chang 2015). Tentatively scheduled space 
tourism launches for Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are reported to begin in 2020. 
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Virgin Galactic will launch from the Spaceport American in Truth or Consequences, New 
Mexico (Sammler & Lynch, 2019), and Blue Origin will launch from West Texas (David, 
2005; Davidian, 2019). For the space-tourism sector to experience the fruition of the 
marketplace cycles, necessary safety improvements resulting in safety levels at least 
equal to the levels of early commercial aviation are required (Loizou, 2006). 
 
Figure 3. Changes in launch cost per kilogram to low earth orbit. 
Note: From The Recent Large Reduction in Space Launch Cost, by H. Jones, 2018, Paper 
presented at the 48th International Conference on Environmental Systems. Albuquerque, 
NM, US: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
Purpose for the Study 
The purposes of this exploratory, sequential, mixed-methods (ESMM) study were 
to identify a method to introduce an SMS program to commercial space organizations 
and to explore the presence of high-reliability theory (HRT) attributes in companies with 
an existing SMS. An SMST attribute-based survey instrument was designed and tested to 
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uncover any underlying recognition of the elements. A comparison between SMS 
responders and non-SMS responders allowed the attributes of safety management system 
theory (SMST) to be measured in the commercial space industry. 
The first objective of the study was to develop a means to ascertain whether the 
attributes of SMS exist in commercial space organizations. The existence of SMST 
attributes may allow commercial space companies a more expedited means of 
implementing an SMS. The second objective was to assess the presence of the SMST in 
commercial space companies to validate the survey and to create benchmark values for 
future commercial space-organization testing. The third was to examine HRT attributes in 
an SMS environment. HRT attributes are a well-established group of safety-related traits 
that reside among the members of some successful high-risk organizations with very few 
accidents. Recently researchers have focused on the means of adopting these attributes in 
the existing safety culture (e.g., in the medical field; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Developing a means to determine the existence of HRT traits may allow companies that 
use an SMS the ability to augment existing safety policies, thereby increasing the safety 
awareness of members and offering additional safety tools. 
A new set of survey questions were required to test for SMST attributes to 
accomplish these tasks. The design of existing published SMS survey questions does not 
target revealing SMS attributes in organizations without an SMS. The final survey added 
two demographic questions to published HRT survey questions. Furthermore, the 
intended goals of this research were to expand the literature related to safety theory and 
practices in commercial space operations. Simultaneously, this research expands the 
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theory of high reliability, specifically in organizations using an SMS as the formal 
protocol. 
Operating in space remains a high-risk undertaking with a need for standard 
safety protocols among space organizations. Adopting a standardized SMS, as well as 
introducing additional safety concepts, may help the FAA/AST more efficiently enforce 
safety standards (FAA, 2015a). The feasibility of implementing a proven, holistic, and 
proactive safety program such as an SMS in companies might become more prevalent 
(Chen & Chen, 2012). Furthermore, augmenting operations with additional safety 
theories, such as HRT, may positively impact safety. Highlighting situations where HRT 
exists naturally in an SMS environment may offer companies opportunities to adopt 
additional safety initiatives without changing the underlying safety structure. Studies 
performed with SMS and HRT have implied a correlation between these two concepts 
during operations (Pariès, Macchi, Valot, & Deharvengt, 2018). This connection means 
that different theories may have overlapping influences on the safety culture of an 
organization. Measuring whether members embrace the concepts may help enhance the 
overall safety culture of an organization. Determining that attributes of SMST exist in 
organizations may help them implement an SMS more effectively. Showing the existence 
of any HRT traits offers possible means to augment existing safety protocols. 
An SMS is a unique type of researched safety system that involves the entire 
organization as one, all following a standardized set of safety principals (Chen & Chen, 
2012). This suggests that an SMS intertwines with a safety culture, integrated into the 
entire operation from top executives to new hires (Antonsen 2009). As a formal safety 
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system, SMS is used internationally and provides a systematic safety approach for a 
formal, universal safety protocol (ICAO, 2013). 
With an increase in private commercial space operations, the FAA/AST may 
introduce a formal standardized SMS structure for the industry (FAA, 2015a). The 2015 
NTSB report on the crash of SpaceShipTwo by Scaled Composites encouraged the idea 
of adopting an SMS. The report concluded, 
“The NTSB is encouraged by the FAA/AST’s progress in implementing SMS and 
believes that, if SMS principles are followed, they will be an effective means for 
enhancing the regulatory oversight of the commercial space industry. However, at 
the time of the evaluation of Scaled’s experimental permit applications, 
FAA/AST management underutilized FAA/AST evaluators’ expertise, even 
though they understood the risks associated with commercial space flight, because 
FAA/AST management appeared to be more concerned about ensuring that the 
FAA’s authority in this emerging industry was not being exceeded beyond 
defined limits and maintaining the timeframe in which to approve experimental 
permit applications. Further, the filtering of questions and the lack of direct 
communication between FAA/AST technical staff and Scaled technical staff 
impeded Scaled’s ability to take advantage of the FAA/AST’s safety expertise.” 
(NTSB, 2015, p. 60) 
Although not in use currently, a standard SMS among private commercial space 
community members will allow the FAA/AST, as the government safety-oversight 
agency, to regulate the industry more effectively (Hale, 2003). Similar to the world’s 
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airline-safety structure, a standard safety strategy would provide the necessary agency 
tools to successfully maintain safety (Chatzipanagiotis & Kyriakopoulos, 2019). 
HRT was introduced during the mid-1980s and continues to be of interest in 
multiple industries. High reliability organizations (HRO), or organizations operating 
without accidents in high-risk environments, exhibit HRT traits (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2015). Research on the expansion of organizations that exhibit HRT attributes grew to 
include the medical industry as well (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
The addition of SMS into commercial space will be a new approach to safety 
management. To date, no commercial space company has adopted the use of an SMS. 
Similarly, the introduction of HRT attributes into an airline with an active SMS may offer 
additional safety tools for the organization. The recognition of SMST or HRT may have a 
positive impact on an organization’s overall safety levels. 
The commercial space industry works diligently to operate safely. Given the 
nature of risky, repetitive operations, the chances of maintaining a high level of safety 
may prove challenging. A catastrophic event involving fatalities of space-crew members 
and the public on the ground would have a devastating impact on the entire space 
industry. Additionally, an accident may have an overwhelming economic outcome on the 
company, causing severe financial hardships. Today’s commercial space industry 
encompasses all aspects of spacecraft design, manufacturing, and operations. The 
FAA/AST (2015a) SMS manual discusses the development of a formal SMS program for 
future implementation. SMS has proven to be a comprehensive, proactive safety method 
in aviation, medicine, and other industries around the world (Moorkamp, Kramer, van 
Gulijk, & Ale et al., 2014; Zee & Murray, 2009). 
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Problem Statement 
The FAA/AST may find itself in the same position that the FAA did with the 
airlines, with the need for a universal, industrywide safety protocol. The commercial 
space industry is projected to expand rapidly (Dickson, 2020), aligned with the need for a 
consistent, formal safety protocol. The FAA/AST projects commercial space companies 
will seek more than 50 licenses for launch and recovery operations in 2020. 
Implementing a standardized SMS for the industry may become an essential aspect of 
maintaining high levels of safety by FAA/AST. In other industries, such as industrial or 
service sectors, companies using an SMS have shown positive effects through lower 
accident rates and improvements to the culture as a whole (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-
Peón, & Vázquez-Ordás, 2007). This trend may hold for commercial space as well. 
Additionally, understanding whether high reliability attributes exist in an SMS 
environment may foster a positive safety culture and may prove to be a significant step 
forward. A group of researchers from the University of California, Berkeley, developed 
HRT in the 1980s (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Sutcliffe, 2011). The principles of high 
reliability traditionally were used to describe HROs that were high-risk companies with 
limited numbers of accidents (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Rijpma, 1997; Roberts, 1990). 
Therefore, it is conceivable that high reliability traits exist in the members working in an 
airline SMS structure (Dekker & Woods, 2009). 
It is unclear whether commercial space companies will adopt the structure of SMS 
organically. Although each commercial space company has a safety program with an 
existing safety culture, adopting a formal SMS may require companies to make 
adjustments to their present safety structures (Moorkamp et al., 2014). It is also unclear 
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whether the attributes of HRT can be determined to exist in the airline industry. 
Traditionally, HRT attributes are a means to describe an HRO whereas an SMS is 
operations based and measurable as a formal safety structure (Pariès et al., 2018). 
Research Questions 
Comparing responses from participants in organizations with an SMS to those in 
organizations without an SMS offered the opportunity for direct evaluations. Those 
working in an SMS environment were more likely to have stronger reactions to SMS 
questions. These results may offer a baseline for the comparison between the two groups. 
Additionally, comparisons of mean values from the responses for HRT attribute questions 
offer the opportunity to conclude levels of understanding and acceptance. Data accrued 
using identical surveys were sent to separate groups. The following research questions 
were tested during the quantitative phase of the study: 
1. What is the validity and reliability of a measurement instrument that measures 
the overarching concept of SMS in aviation and commercial space 
organizations? 
2. What are the differences in the mean responses of participants from 
commercial space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an SMS on 
factors underlying SMS? 
3. What are the differences in the mean responses of participants from 
commercial space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an SMS on 
factors underlying HRT? 
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Hypotheses 
A method of preparing commercial space for SMS implementation used in this 
research project was to determine whether any SMS attributes already existed in the 
industry. To date, no commercial space company uses an SMS as a formal safety 
protocol. This situation presented a challenge given that no SMS historical data were 
available for comparison in the industry. The method of testing underlying SMS 
attributes required developing, through the iterative grounded-theory process, lists of 
SMS attributes for questions on a survey instrument. These questions needed to capture 
the essence of the elements without using any of the standard SMS taxonomies. The 
survey instrument was the means to determine which SMS elements participants 
recognized. This study’s prediction was that some underlying attributes of SMSs exist in 
organizations in the commercial space industry that do not have an SMS in place as their 
formal safety structure. 
Additionally, the study entailed surveying for HRT attributes in an airline SMS 
environment. The Safety Organizing Scale, validated by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007), was 
adopted for this research. The researcher predicted that some HRT attributes would exist 
organically in airline organizations having a fully functioning SMS safety protocol. HRT 
attributes are not concepts currently discussed in airline safety culture. 
The following hypotheses were tested for the recognition of SMS attributes in 
commercial space operations. Comparing commercial space companies without SMS and 
airlines with SMS results allowed for an evaluation between participants. Baseline values 
helped determine areas of focus or reveal emphasis items for future testing in commercial 
space organizations. 
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• H0a There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure safety 
policy among commercial space organizations without an SMS and airlines 
with an SMS. 
• H0b There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure safety-risk 
management (SRM) among commercial space organizations without an SMS 
and airlines with an SMS. 
• H0c There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure safety 
assurance among commercial space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS. 
• H0d There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure safety 
promotion among commercial space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS. 
The following hypotheses determine the basic understanding or recognition of 
HRT attributes. Participants from both groups may not have been aware of the HRT 
traits. However, comparisons between the two groups offers evaluation of basic 
understandings of latent HRT. 
• H0e  There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure 
preoccupation with failure among commercial space organizations without an 
SMS and airlines with an SMS. 
• H0f  There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure the 
reluctance to simplify operations among commercial space organizations 
without an SMS and airlines with an SMS. 
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• H0g  There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure sensitivity 
to operations among commercial space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS. 
• Hoh  There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure resilience 
in operations among commercial space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS. 
• H0i  There is no difference in the mean value of items that measure deference 
to expertise among commercial space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS. 
These hypotheses target determining any effects the two demographic questions 
of role and time in the industry may have on the recognition or understanding of SMS 
and HRT attributes. 
• H0j. There is no difference in the mean values of perception of SMST in the 
management role in the organization. 
• H0k. There is no difference in the mean values of perception of SMST in the 
length of time in the industry. 
• H0l. There is no difference in mean values of perception of HRT in the 
management role in the organization. 
• H0m. There is no difference in mean values of perception of HRT in length of 
time in the industry in the organization. 
Research Limitations and Assumptions 
For this research study, one assumption was that the final survey instrument 
applied to all high risk, complex, repetitive-operation organizations. An additional 
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assumption was that the sample group represented the overall larger subject group. 
Efforts were made to include individuals who represented a diverse set of the most 
representative aspects of the two groups. Other assumptions included the following: 
1. The groups consisted of qualified participants. 
2. The sample group represented a general sample of the total population. 
3. The study surveyed general companies with an SMS and commercial space 
organizations without an SMS. 
4. Participants in the non-SMS group did not have experience with an SMS. 
5. Participants took the survey once. 
The researcher worked diligently to diminish the effects of any limitations that 
may have skewed the results. The limitations of this study included the following: 
1. Unequal test-group sizes may have impacted statistical analysis. This issue 
may have caused some inconsistencies in statistical testing of mean values 
between groups. 
2. Snowballing, a technique where participants send the link to anyone they 
deem qualified, was encouraged for participants (as in Baltar & Brunet, 2012). 
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the snowball technique in this 
study. What makes this technique advantageous is that those surveyed felt 
empowered to include their colleagues, making determining the test 
population and response rate difficult. 
3. Survey fatigue in the test groups lowered participation. The pilot study group 
was surveyed several times during the year. The timing for the pilot study was 
at the end of the year, which corresponded with the holidays. Survey fatigue 
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was also an issue mentioned by several respondents from commercial space 
companies. The mitigation step to limit survey fatigue was keeping the 
anticipated survey-completion time between 12 and 16 minutes. 
4. Kurtosis values were higher, showing higher skewness. Skewness was 
anticipated, given that the Likert-type scale questions showed strong 
reactions. 
Scope of Research 
The study did not address all possible issues surrounding the implementation of 
an SMS or determine SMST attribute issues related to commercial space operations. The 
study also did not cover all the aspects related to HRT-specific questions in airlines 
companies. The pilot-study survey was available for 4 weeks from December 19th 
through January 6th. The main survey testing of the commercial space groups and the 
airline group was for 4 weeks from February 7th through March 7th. 
The study was limited to participants from various aspects of commercial space 
operations. These included those working in the production of rockets or satellites and 
launch and recovery operations. Participants from the airlines possess a working 
knowledge of SMS by training and experience from their respective companies. 
Participants included pilots from flight operations and flight attendants from inflight 
operations. The scope for both groups included various levels, from new employees to 
senior managers. 
Expected Findings 
Survey results were anticipated to show that some SMS attributes produce 
comparably high mean values for commercial space companies when compared to the 
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airline results. These values, if similar, signified a level of acceptance of SMS concepts. 
Additionally, the expectation was that those who worked in an airline SMS environment 
would comprehend some HRT attributes. An acknowledgment seen through the mean 
values would have signified a level of acceptance of underlying HRT concepts, showing 
similarities in HRT mean values between the two groups. 
Summary 
The commercial space industry is expanding to accommodate the demand to take 
crewmembers, materials, and satellites into space. The industry will continue to grow as 
space tourism becomes a feasible option for more people. As the commercial space 
industry expands, the FAA/AST will determine a standard safety-management protocol 
for all companies. Much like the commercial airline industry, managing a standard safety 
protocol may prove beneficial to the FAA/AST as well as to individual companies. This 
research study attempted to determine whether SMS attributes exists in commercial space 
companies. This determination may help bring an SMS to the commercial space industry 
more efficiently. 
The attributes of HRT are advantageous in various aspects of the medical 
industry. HRT is not, in itself, a safety protocol. Instead, HRT is a list of attributes shared 
by members of a company. Understanding whether HRT exists in airlines may help 
amplify current safety protocols and increase safety awareness. HRT attributes may be 
perceived as independent of each other. Determining recognition of HRT attributes in the 
airline industry may offer augmentations to existing safety protocols. Identifying whether 
one or more HRT attitudes exist naturally may allow an airline to expand, include HRT 




The existing literature describes topics such as commercial space, safety culture, 
SMST, and HRT. To date, few published articles exist detailing HRT in an airline SMS 
environment or SMST in a non-SMS environment in commercial space. This chapter 
provides a review of the literature on the growth of the commercial space industry, safety 
culture, SMS/SMST, and HRT. 
Safety Culture 
In general, the foundation of an organization’s levels of safety relates to whether 
all levels of the organization have accepted the safety culture. A group’s culture is the 
overall genetic building blocks that any successful organization needs to foster and is 
arguably the most critical organizational element needed for a successful company 
(Reason, 1998). An organization’s ability to gauge how well the safety culture is 
functioning depends entirely on how the group defines it (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). 
Five contributing factors define safety culture: informed, flexible, reporting, learning, and 
just (see Figure 4; Reason, 1997). 
A common cause organization like the U.S. Air Force has a complex safety 
culture (J. M. Smith, 1998). “If the culture is shared and endorsed across the various 
subgroups that comprise the organization, then a sense of mission exists, and the 
organization is relatively cohesive, both internally and in its approach to the outside 
world” (J. M. Smith, 1998, p. 41). This may hold true for any aerospace organization as 
well. Defining a safety culture is similar to defining a healthy culture, as both include 
words that are quite broad with meanings that are difficult to encapsulate 
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comprehensively (Reason, 1997, 1998). Moreover, if senior management perceives a 
safety culture negatively, those actions may adversely influence others in the 
organization, resulting in a decline in the overall safety culture (Antonsen, 2009; Reason, 
1998.
 
Figure 4. The components of safety culture. 
Note. Adapted from Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, by J. Reason, 
Burlington, VT, US: Ashgate. Reprinted by permission from the Global Aviation 
Information Network.  
 
Management must be careful when using culture to rationalize mistakes that do 
not make sense for the company (Myers, Nyce, & Dekker, 2014). This caution is true for 
a reporting culture as well. Some members of an organization may negatively influence 
the group’s reporting culture (Vaughan, 1997). Organization members may not always 
follow the prescribed safety procedures and, if reported, may cause needless changes to 
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current safety procedures (Dekker, 2003). Accordingly, a safety culture includes how 
people in the organization think and act. 
Any organization’s patterned way of thinking reflects its essence or the belief of 
the groups around its core (J. M. Smith, 1998). Without a robust organizational culture, it 
is unlikely a company can function properly (Schein, 2010). Traditionally, an 
organization’s management dictates culture. The goal is to have all employees of the 
organization adopt a positive safety culture encompassing all five elements. (Nævestad, 
2009). At its core, culture appears to require a formal, systematic safety program that 
may be similar for aviation, space, medicine, and other high-risk organizations 
(Guldenmund, 2010). The development of a safety culture grows over time and directly 
relates to the environment of the company (Guldenmund, 2010). 
Safety Management System Theory 
The theory of safety management and SMS stem from systems engineering and 
quality management from Hale, Heming, Carthey, and Kirwan in 1997. Moorkamp et al. 
(2014) wrote the first journal article to use the term SMST to define the research Hale et 
al. (1997) had completed in describing the functionality of an SMS. An SMS is a 
comprehensive, formal, process-based safety structure that includes official descriptions 
of duties, practices, actions, and processes for risk management first instituted in the early 
2000s (Álvarez-Santos, Miguel-Hávila, Herrera, & Nieto, 2018; Liou, Yen, & Tzeng, 
2008; Stolzer et al., 2018). An SMS may also be an agreement with a governing agency 
that may require adjustments to the process to remain in compliance with the 
corporation’s proactive commitment to safety (Hale, 2003; Liou et al., 2008). The origins 
of SMS come from a well-defined, formal management structure described by division, 
27 
duties, practices, actions, and processes for risk management (Álvarez-Santos et al., 
2018). 
SMST includes several safety practices ranging from safety management to safety 
culture, normal-accident theory (NAT), and HRT (Moorkamp et al., 2014). The 
orientation of safety-management theory is toward an organization’s administration and 
safety control processes, aiming to minimize operational uncertainty (Hale et al., 1997). 
SMST is more specific and includes all process areas of an organization (Hale et al., 
1997). SMST incorporates the elements needed by a management team to curtail safety 
ambiguity in operations. Regardless of the theory, Dekker (2005) challenged the idea that 
addressing and reducing all environmental ambiguity to attain safety is considered to be 
the customary everyday work of everyone in the organization. However, safety 
management may not be the answer for all companies and cannot take the place of sound 
engineering processes. Total reliance on an SMS to replace a basic understanding of how 
human factors interact with the operations would not increase safety (Hale, 2003). 
Adopting a safety program without understanding or planning how it will integrate into 
operations can create safety-culture issues in the organization (Hale, 2003; Hale et al., 
1997). Without full support of the entire organization, from senior management to line 
worker, an SMS will not succeed. 
The SMS as a management tool has become a standard for some organizations of 
risk, including airlines, air traffic control, and the medical industry (ICAO, 2013; 
Moorkamp et al., 2014). European government regulatory agencies moved to install a 
structured, standard safety protocol across various companies in certain industries. This 
philosophical change stemmed partly from the desire of governments to cease the 
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detailed regulatory tasks of managing the individual safety programs of different 
companies (Hale, 2003). Instead, by focusing on a universal standard, government safety 
monitoring became streamlined across an industry. This desire led to the development of 
an SMS framework in many European industries (Hale et al., 1997). The aspiration for 
safety consistency led to the development of the standards used for early SMS programs 
(Hale et al., 1997). An SMS cannot be a static program for an organization. Like all 
safety programs, it requires adjustments to reflect changes to internal and external 
influences with ongoing modifications to the operating environment. 
SMSs have become widely recognized as providing a systematic approach to 
managing safety that includes the necessary critical parts of organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies, and procedures (ICAO, 2013). This approach seems to be in 
line with programs listed in the FAA/AST’s SMS manual for future initiatives for 
commercial space companies (FAA, 2015a). To date, no published implementation 
timeline exists for an SMS in the commercial space industry. 
Companies adopting the formal SMS structure had higher safety performances 
than those that did not (Bottani, Monica, & Vignali, 2009). However, adopting an SMS 
was clearly insufficient without the leadership to advance the program (Pariès et al., 
2018). Programs require constant monitoring of the processes to maintain safety 
(Remawi, Bates, & Dix, 2011). Safety directions, as well as promoting a positive safety 
culture (informed culture, flexible culture, reporting culture, learning culture, and just 
culture), must come from top company leadership (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, not all companies are candidates for a SMS. An organization that does not 
share key safety policies or distribute safety information in the company may not be 
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successful in the adoption of an SMS (Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018). For example, in 
discussing the rapid assault forces of Dutch military expeditionary forces, organizations 
requiring rapid adjustments may not have benefitted from an SMS (Moorkamp et al., 
2014). An SMS program did not seem nimble enough to make quick operational 
adjustments required by an organization and required constant major adjustments. 
The design of an SMS allows for continuous improvements to safety by actively 
identifying hazards, collecting and analyzing data, and assessing risks (Stolzer et al., 
2018). Different from other programs, an SMS incorporates the whole organization with 
the vision and direction coming from top management (Chen & Chen, 2012, 2014; FAA, 
2015b; Hale et al., 1997). However, a classic top-down approach might not possess the 
flexibility needed to work in a dynamic situation where operational flexibility may be 
required (Rasmussen, 1997). SMS success hinges on the level to which each member 
feels integrated into the program being led by senior management. Although an SMS is 
adjustable for any size company, not all companies will have a successful SMS program. 
For an SMS to be successful in an organization, the program must be employee-
centric (Chen & Chen, 2012). In contrast, if the foundations of a positive safety culture 
are not met and internal communications begin to falter, the organization may begin to 
drift away from standard operating procedures. The effectiveness of the safety culture 
dictates whether a company can successfully implement an SMS (Chen & Chen, 2012; 
Gordon, Kirwan, & Perrin, 2007). Robust organization-wide safety design with risk and 
hazard identification and management processes, including safety assurance, must be 
founded on a complete understanding of all processes, employee functions, and all other 
internal and external forces (Arendt & Adamski, 2016). In the absence of a social-
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technical development approach, organizations that do not emphasize employee social 
interactions or value identifying risk-prevention opportunities to improve the operation 
the program will not prosper (Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018). How an employee views the 
organization’s SMS program affects their overall operations decision-making (Chen & 
Chen, 2014). The SMS design emphasizes the need for a unified team to proactively 
manage the safety of the group. Successful SMS practices directly relate to the safety 
self-talk of each member, impacted by the actions of management (Chen & Chen, 2014). 
Often, SMS studies are only direction-oriented and do not strengthen the beliefs, values, 
and commitments that drive adoption by the group (Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018). A 
company or government agency cannot merely force a safety protocol on its members. 
An emotional work–employee connection increases the chances for success and 
strengthens the culture of the organization. How management expresses their views of 
safety has a direct impact on an employee’s view of the importance of safety (Fernández-
Muñiz et al., 2007). Without management’s complete understanding and acceptance of 
SMS, the program will not prevail. 
The FAA mandated the use of an SMS for all airlines, replacing what had been 
their former safety structures and procedures. A company with an SMS may expect to see 
reductions in the duplication of safety tasks, resulting in lower costs with a reduction in 
overall risk. Eliminating any repetitious duties could increase profits and streamline 
responsibilities and relationships. However, simply instituting an SMS will not always 
deliver an increase in safety levels. A critical element for the FAA was to have SMS 
compliance from all commercial airlines accompanying the advantage of cost savings or 
a lower financial burden for operators (Lercel, Steckel, Mondello, Carr, & Patankar, 
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2011). The requirement for management was to prepare the organization for the program 
and make any necessary adjustments to the safety culture (Hale, 2003). At the micro and 
macrolevels, cost savings only appear if the organization’s safety culture feels fully 
supported by senior management. 
SMS has seen an increased in acceptance from several industries. The U.S. 
aviation industry began the adoption of an SMS in 2010 with mandatory implementation 
in 2018 (FAA, 2015a). This implementation came years after European airlines and other 
international companies had adopted the program. Some industries outside the airlines 
were quicker to adopt the safety program. The question remains whether the voluntary 
implementation of an SMS is advantageous for all organizations. Some in the medical 
industry appreciated the advantages of the risk-mitigation elements of SMS and began to 
implement the safety-management protocol (Wilf-Miron et al., 2003). The medical field 
also recognized the benefits of HRT attributes and adopted HRT to augment safety 
management as well (Sutcliffe, 2011). 
Several safety strategies can fit with an SMS framework, including numerous 
models, theories, or other safety programs. Among them, High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO), and the Resilience Engineering (RE) movements have 
received increasing attention in recent years. Particularly after the Fukushima 
disaster in March 2011, because they address the management of the unexpected. 
(Pariès et al., 2018, p. 1) 
Opportunities may exist to augment safety procedures and understanding beyond the 
traditional framework of an SMS through the addition of other safety features.  
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Figure 5 depicts a framework for a possible commercial space proactive SMS. 
 
Figure 5. A Safety-management system model for commercial space organizations. 
Note. Adapted from A Safety Management Model for FAR 141 Approved Flight Schools, 
by F. A. Mendonca & T. Q. Carney, 2017, Journal of Aviation Technology and 
Engineering, 6(2), 3. https://doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1144 
Safety management system components. Chen and Chen (2012) stated that 
SMS, as a proactive safety model, was different from other safety structures in aviation, 
medicine, or nuclear power. The FAA SMS manual (2015a) indicated that the elements 
of an SMS include safety policy, SRM, safety, and safety promotion (see Appendix A). 
For an organization to have an SMS, all four components must be included in the safety 
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system (Chen & Chen, 2012; Stolzer et al., 2018). Figure 6 shows the FAA’s image of 
how the four elements of SMS interact. 
 
Figure 6. Safety management system. 
Note. From Safety Management System for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 
Operations Certificate Holders; Final Rule, by Federal Aviation Administration, 2015a, 
Washington, DC, US: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Safety policy. According to the FAA’s SMS manual (2015a), safety policy is the 
foundational document of the SMS that expresses the commitment that management 
makes to improve safety incrementally. The policy identifies the key senior manager 
ultimately responsible for upholding the safety of the organization (ICAO, 2013). The 
manual also describes any procedures, practices, and organizational configurations 
needed to meet the safety goal (FAA, 2015a, 2015b; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, 
Stolzer et al., 2018). It is incumbent on management to set specific, well-defined safety 
objectives for the organization that will achieve a high level of safety (Chen & Chen, 
2012, 2014; Stolzer et al., 2018). The SMS document includes any necessary policies, 
safety processes, and operations methods necessary for the organization to successfully 
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implement an SMS and includes information on emergency preparedness under the 
policy section, providing the organization’s procedures in the event of an emergency 
event (FAA, 2015c; ICAO, 2013). The goal of the emergency-preparedness plan is to 
mitigate negative effects on the company caused by an unplanned event. 
Safety risk management. The SRM process is a formal procedure used to 
determine any new requirements or adjustments to the existing risk-control mitigation 
methods. The SRM process is iterative and based on the appraisals of acceptable risk to 
the organization (FAA, 2015b). Companies develop an SRM method over time that must 
be adjusted as needed for ongoing additional threats. An SRM process is a proactive tool 
used to determine hazards through the analysis of collected organizational-safety 
information (Velazquez & Bier, 2015). A well-structured safety-risk matrix allows for 
adjustments to operations through active hazard and risk identification (Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015). 
Safety assurance. Safety assurance is a process organizations use to evaluate the 
efficacy of the SMS. Companies maintain safety assurance by measuring the current 
safety methods against the expected safety goals set for the organization (Velazquez & 
Bier, 2015; Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Consistent analysis of safety data helps produce the 
information needed to maintain strong risk mitigation controls. Consistent analysis is the 
means of evaluating the organization’s ongoing operational situation (Dekker & Woods, 
2009). 
Safety promotion. The fourth component consists of safety promotion. Safety 
promotion comprises a company’s training, learning, and safety communications (FAA, 
2015b; ICAO, 2013). This section contains the recurrent training requirements that help 
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reinforce the idea of safety responsibilities, the safety policy, and reporting procedures 
(FAA ATO, 2017). The initial and recurrent safety training and appropriate 
communications are the basis for fostering a robust culture of safety (Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015). 
Scalability. By design, companies of any size can implement an SMS. The 
complexity of each organization’s SMS program should be adjustable to the size of the 
organization (FAA, 2015b). A strong safety culture should be prevalent in the 
organization where members are integral to the success of the operations. An SMS is 
scalable to individual organizations and defined by four traditional elements. Safety 
policy, safety risk assessment, safety assurance, and safety promotion must all be present 
to be considered an actual SMS. If one SMS element is missing, it ceases to be an SMS 
and becomes just a safety program (G. Ullrich, personal communication, September 18, 
2019). Although each SMS may be customized, each will have elements that will work in 
conjunction (Chen & Chen, 2012). 
Implementation. Organizations implement SMS safety protocols in four stages 
(ICAO, 2013; see Figure 7). In Phase I, organization lay the foundation of what the safety 
policy will entail and identify the accountable executive (ICAO, 2013). Also included in 
this phase is a gap analysis between available organizational resources and the 
requirements from a national or international government agency. Phase II entails a 
reactive safety-management process that includes the implementation schedule of the 
program, training, documentation, and development of a means of safety communication 
(ICAO, 2013). Phase III, the proactive and predictive safety-management process, refers 
to a refinement of the process in the organization, including changes to training based on 
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safety data (ICAO, 2013). This phase also allows for any additional safety programs to be 
implemented and adjustments to current safety policies based on historical and forecasted 
safety data. Phase IV is the operational safety-assurance phase that encapsulates use for 
performance indicators and performance targets and allows for continual improvement of 
SMS processes (ICAO, 2013). 
 
Figure 7. Safety management system implementation phases. 
Note. From Safety Management Manual (SMM) (3rd ed.), by International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2013, Montreal, Canada. 
High-reliability theory. High reliability emerged from a group of researchers at 
the University of California, Berkeley, observing a Navy carrier operation in the 1980s, 
searching for what factors in safety culture offered virtually risk-free operations (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2015). HRT defines the level of focus required from all levels of the 
organization to maintain a consistently high safety level in the operation with all the 
intrinsic hazards (Dekker & Woods, 2009). An HRO is an organization that exhibits the 
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core characteristics of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise through mindfulness 
while staying error-free in the management of dangerous systems (Boin & Schulman, 
2008; Weick, 1987). HROs also can quickly return to a state of normalcy after hazard 
events. 
HRT consists of attributes seen in high-risk complex groups with dangerous 
functions that operate virtually error-free (Enya, Pillay, & Dempsey, 2018; Roberts & 
Bea, 2001). However, HRT and NAT are two concepts that describe accident rates 
surrounding hazards found in a high-risk company (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). 
HRT researchers uncovered specific organizations taking extraordinary measures to 
remain error-free in a high-risk industry (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Weick et al., 
1999). HRT evolved from the concept that success relates to maintaining a closed 
organizational structure but evolved to accept external influences (i.e., FAA/AST 
regulations in the case of aerospace companies; Weick et al., 1999). 
Mindful organizing. Organizational leadership has a large positive or negative 
impact on the acceptance of SMST or HRT by members of HRT groups. Safety culture 
cannot merely be forced from those in power (Gordon et al., 2007). To achieve an HRO 
or an SMS, leadership dictates how group culture will evolve (Schubert, Arbinger, & 
Sola Morena, 2016). For any organization, culture is the institution’s set of beliefs and 
attitudes that frame the group and develop robust positive safety values (Remawi et al., 
2011). 
The idea of central collective mindfulness is a requirement for a high-risk 
organization to remain accident-free (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Roberts 1993). 
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Mindfulness is how organizational members intertwine the five HRT attributes and 
remain mindful of other issues that may need attention through the actions they take. 
Mindfulness is a learned trait that requires questioning the status quo and focusing on 
accident prevention. It is essential to recognize adverse trending events early enough to 
make a straightforward adjustment before these events result in catastrophic issues. 
Having effective people in the appropriate positions is key to allowing for early safety 
decision-making, fostering a feeling of employee ownership in the program (Dekker & 
Woods, 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006, 2015). Perceived 
ownership is a crucial element for successful organizational mindfulness (Weick & 
Sutcliff, 2015). 
Collective mindfulness consists of five interrelated behavior processes: 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify the operations, sensitivity to the 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007). The five elements tie together through a collective mindfulness that all members 
practice (Haavik, 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006, 2015). The safety culture of 
employees is augmented in HROs through collective mindfulness (Weick &Sutcliffe, 
2006).  
When considering HRT attributes, qualities of culture provide insights into the 
context of care that directly influences reliability (Pronovost et al., 2006). A proven 
method of improving safety and increasing the quality of an organizational output is 
HRT, consisting of organizational design principles and improved management 
approaches that lower error rates and improve overall safety (Riley, Davis, Miller, & 
McCullough, 2010). HRT includes a complete group commitment to safety, multiple 
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methods for task completion, well-designed safety measures, and a whole-group 
organizational learning culture (Pronovost et al., 2006; Riley et al., 2010). However, 
several elements shape an organization’s culture including policies, procedures, observed 
practices, and personalities of leadership. Rank and file members also have a role in 
shaping the safety culture. Organizations need to include real-world training 
environments to foster the skills needed by newer members of the group to more quickly 
adopt HRO facility (Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987). Figure 8 depicts mindfulness as 
a conduit for HRT attributes. 
 
Figure 8. High reliability theory flows from mindfulness. 
Note. From Van de Walle, B., & Turoff, M. (2008). Decision support for emergency 
situations. Information Systems and E-Business Management, 6(3), 295–316. 
doi:10.1007/s10257-008-0087-z. (p. 300). 
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High Reliability Theory Components 
Preoccupation with failure. Preoccupation with failure includes a detailed focus 
on all activities in the organization (Haavik, 2014; La Porte, 1996). Preoccupation 
includes increased alertness, maintaining an open mind to alternative ways of completing 
the job, and anticipating issues (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). HRT avers members 
communicate openly, regardless of rank, and without fear of reprisal (Lekka, 2011). An 
event considered a “close call” becomes an accident in the eyes of the company. These 
events may result in procedural changes to alter safety methods (Lekka, 2011). 
Management encourages the reporting of unfavorable events, and those who bring the 
information forward are rewarded for doing so, fostering an open culture. Management 
celebrates reporting an issue that turns out to be inconsequential. 
Sensitivity to the operation. The sensitivity to operations is a common element 
among members of the organization who exhibit HRT attributes. Members of the group 
pay particular attention to every detail of the operation and should be open and available 
for input anywhere when needed (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). Upper managers cross-
trained for various duties are available to act as frontline employees when needed (Vogus 
& Rerup, 2017). Members expect job feedback and are encouraged to expand their skill 
sets beyond their job duties. This trait allows individuals to expand their skills to create 
mission redundancies (Saunders, 2015). This cross-training allows associates to assist 
with other areas as necessary, thereby expanding safety effectiveness during a time of 
need. 
Reluctance to simplify. The reluctance to simplify relates to an organization 
characteristic that does not accept simplifications for procedures used in daily operations. 
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Employees are encouraged to gain operational diversity that questions the current status 
of the operation at all times (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). The goal is to have a complete 
representation of how operations are functioning at all times. Organizations that 
demonstrate HRT attributes do not become complacent during smooth operations, but 
instead maintain constant vigilance (Dekker & Woods, 2009). Continual data-driven 
probing of the process for errors is essential, retaining a skeptical perspective during 
smooth-running operations. If employees feel that an operational issue exists, they are 
encouraged to express their concerns to management (Pariès et al., 2018). This quality 
develops a high level of internal trust (Sutcliffe, 2011). 
Commitment to resilience. The commitment to resilience is the ability to detect, 
correct, and return to a “dynamically stable” operational state quickly after a safety issue 
(Sutcliffe, 2011, p. 136). Organizational learning and bottom-up informational flows are 
essential and result in overall intellectual growth. (Marais, Dulac, & Leveson, 2004). 
Management encourages and expects maintenance of a just culture through innovative 
solutions to issues (Riley et al., 2010). HRT attributes, encouraged by organizational 
leaders, offer individuals opportunities to use their experience, imagination, and other 
outside safety examples or information to solve any problems (Marais et al., 2004). 
Informal discussion groups meet outside of formal organization meetings to help share 
knowledge among members (Vogus & Rerup, 2017). These informal discussions help 
retain operational knowledge that may not be covered in formal meetings, guaranteeing 
corporate knowledge is retained. 
Deference to expertise. The final characteristic of HRT is deference to expertise. 
Regardless of their rank in the company, a subject-matter expert (SME) nearest a pending 
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catastrophe is expected to take charge of the situation and make any necessary 
operational decisions (Saunders, 2015). All members are committed to completing their 
tasks but when needed, will defer to someone who may have more expertise (Riley et al., 
2010). HRO group members expect someone with more proficiency to take the lead 
during high threats when needed (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006, 2015). 
Not all organizations can be successful HROs. Casler (2014) averred it would be 
challenging to implement an HRO in an organization as large as NASA, given the 
complexity of the organization and may be cost-prohibitive as well. Casler speculated 
that it might be difficult because of the required layers of infrastructure needed to 
maintain the overall operational attention required to be considered an HRO. However, 
departments or individual divisions in a larger organization may still exhibit HRT traits 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006, 2015). For an HRO to be successful in a large networked 
organization, collaborative links and dynamic correction abilities would need to part of 
the group’s overall operating structural makeup (Hall, 2016). 
A second concept that addressed organizing around high-hazard technologies in 
organizations is NAT. NAT states accidents will happen as a function of time, regardless 
of any countermeasures in place (Perrow, 2011). An HRO structure could oversimplify 
issues faced by an organization (Marais et al., 2004). Given the complex nature that many 
risky organizations function in today, the HRT idea that an organization will remain 
rational, stable, and a closed system may not be achievable (Shrivastava, Sonpar, & 
Pazzaglia, 2009). 
In turn, building safety-critical systems and following some HRO 
recommendations could have negative results. Both HRT and NAT may limit the safety 
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progress necessary to achieve a more effective safety system by narrowly defining the 
problem and stemming potential solutions. A more effective method to eliminate hazards 
may be to reduce unnecessary complexity and decoupling operations (Marais et al., 
2004), instead, increasing overall safety by eliminating opportunities for human error. 
Being an organization that is both reliable and safe may be in conflict (Marais et al., 
2004). From an operational standpoint, a high level of interactive complexity will need a 
decentralized structure during specific times. When an HRO paradigm was applied to 
create safety under complex, risky conditions, a more optimistic group mindset may 
emerge than that seen in Perrow’s (2011) NAT writings (Andriulo, Arleo, de Carlo, 
Gnoni, & Tucci, 2015). 
Furthermore, organizations that are HRO are not error-free, but errors do not stop 
the HRO from moving forward (Andriulo et al., 2015). HRT researchers offered 
explanations as to why certain companies with tight couplings and complex operations 
have few accidents (Haavik, 2014). This idea is in direct opposition to NAT, which 
contends that HRT cannot prevent accidents over time (La Porte & Rochlin, 1994). 
Summary 
This chapter includes a detailed examination of the existing literature surrounding 
culture, SMS, SMST, and HRT. Although this literature review included a discussion of a 
majority of articles available, it did not include all. The literature review focused on the 
areas incorporated in the research study. 
How the leadership of an organization structures its safety culture and how 
employees view the culture are critical to how well it operates. Safety culture is the way 
an organization functions, especially in times of duress. The literature revealed that the 
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actions of management could have a positive or negative effect on the overall culture. 
The goal of management is to create a positive safety culture in which all members feel 
part of the safety structure and are empowered to have a voice when safety issues arise. 
SMST is the foundation of how an SMS functions. The four main elements of 
policy, risk management, assurance, and promotion, are required for the system for 
function optionally. All four components must be in place and functioning to be 
considered an SMS. Early researchers indicated a high level of effectiveness and 
acceptance in airlines and in the medical field. However, instituting an SMS does not 
guarantee a safety program will result. The whole organization must be fully vested in the 
success of the program, including in meeting any necessary financial requirements. No 
research exists that attempted to predict the successful implementation of an SMS 
program in an organization. 
HRT attributes, although not a safety structure, may be found to exist among 
members working in high-risk companies that have limited numbers of accidents. Early 
research indicated that to be considered an HRO, all five HRT attributes must be present 
in the organization. However, researchers described studies identifying the existence of 
some HRT elements in an organization not traditionally considered an HRO. Detecting 





This study addresses two main questions: Do SMS attributes exist among the 
members of commercial space organizations who operate without an SMS? Do HRT 
attributes exist in airlines with an established SMS? (Henceforward, commercial space 
will denote a non-SMS environment and airlines will denote an SMS environment.) The 
design for this study was an ESMM with grounded theory (GT) using the Delphi method. 
The methodology was divided into three parts: qualitative, survey-instrument design, and 
quantitative analysis. 
The qualitative portion explored the theories of SMSs and HROs. Data accrued 
that included peer-reviewed articles, published surveys, and personal communications 
with SMEs. The qualitative process uncovered SMST and helped the researcher develop 
the questions needed for the SMS survey. The second step was the development of a new 
survey instrument designed to test the existence of SMS attributes in commercial space. 
The third step entailed a quantitative assessment of the survey results from the 
commercial space and airline groups. 
The goals of this study were to create a means to identify underlying SMS 
attributes in commercial space organizations. Further, a study goal was to determine 
whether HRT attributes exist naturally in airlines. The researcher aspired to add to the 
current body of literature on SMST and HRT with the results of the research. The 
conclusions may offer commercial space companies the tools to conclude a financially 
economical means to implement an SMS as the formal safety protocol. Additionally, the 
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results may also establish whether HRT attributes can be a safety-augmentation element 
in SMS environments. 
Exploratory, Sequential, Mixed-Method with Grounded Theory, and the Delphi 
Method 
An ESMM design was used to gather the necessary qualitative data using a GT 
approach. The ESMM consisted of a research process that was qualitative and 
quantitative. Exploratory sequential studies tend to use GT to generate a model or 
framework that guides instrument development for the quantitative phase (Guetterman, 
Babchuk, Howell Smith, & Stevens, 2019). Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 224) stated, 
“In this design, the researcher would first collect focus group data, analyze the 
results, develop an instrument (or other quantitative feature such as a website for 
testing), and then administer it to a sample of a population. In this case, there may 
not be adequate instruments to measure the concepts with the sample the 
investigator wishes to study. In effect, the researcher employs a three-phase 
procedure with the first phase as exploratory, the second as instrument (or 
quantitative feature) development, and the third as administering and testing the 
instrument feature to a sample of a population.” 
Exploratory designs are sequential with the qualitative portions conducted first, 
building to a quantitative study (Guetterman, 2017; Guetterman et al., 2019). The 
qualitative research allowed the data to surface to formulate or uncover any applicable 
theories for quantitative testing. 
The researcher’s 20 years of experience in major airline operations including the 
knowledge and use of an SMS aided in SMS-attribute generation and SMST recognition. 
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The study required a set of crafted survey questions that examined understanding of SMS 
protocol attributes by those unfamiliar with an SMS. Constructivism was used to develop 
the necessary questions for the survey instrument. A perspective that incorporated the 
survey participants’ work environment and the researcher’s experiences helped in 
framing the questions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). 
A review of existing literature presented SMS and HRT characteristics or 
descriptive language, coded to create attribute lists. The GT process facilitated grouping 
similar components into common concepts identified during the iterative process. The 
repeated process further refined the concepts into codes or specific word combinations 
used to guide formulation of SMS-attribute questions. 
In a mixed-methods study, theory development or existing theory advancement 
may come from a deductive (i.e., testing and validity) or an inductive (i.e., emerging 
qualitative theory or pattern) process (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). This researcher used 
an inductive approach for this study. SMST, discussed by Moorkamp et al. (2014), was 
selected as the underlying theory to generate SMS questions. 
Several personal communications with SMEs in the fields of SMS, HRT, SMS 
initiatives at the FAA/AST, SMS in airlines, and SMS in academia were conducted. 
These communications were valuable in adding clarification to the study. Several specific 
discussions were instrumental in formulating the needed survey questions. 
A pilot test group comprising SMS users was used for validation. Once 
completed, the combined survey was tested at commercial space- and airline-industry 
organizations. The results from the two groups were compared for statistically significant 
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differences in mean values. Figure 9 shows the ESMM methodology, qualitative and 
quantitative, with the use of comparison between the two sets of results. 
 



























Rationale for the Method 
The use of ESMM research design was appropriate, given the investigative nature 
of the research project, the desire to further existing theory, and work to develop a survey 
instrument. The steps included the three-part design showed in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Three-step exploratory, sequential method. 
Note. From Plano Clark, V. L., Huddleston-Casas, C. A., Churchill, S. L., O’Neil Green, 
D., & Garrett, A. L. (2008). Mixed Methods Approaches in Family Science Research. 
Journal of Family Issues, 29(11), 1543–1566. p. 1551. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0192513X08318251 
 
The orientation of the qualitative approach was the description, explanation, and 
study of the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2014. Neither a stand-alone 
qualitative nor a quantitative research methodology would have answered the research 
questions or adequately tested the hypotheses (Creswell, 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2018; Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). A plethora of established peer-reviewed 
literature was available that discussed the fundamentals of SMSs. Limited literature was 
available that directly examined SMST attributes for use in survey questions that 
addressed participants in a non-SMS environment. The sequential mixed method worked 
well with GT in creating lists of SMS and HRT attribute codes. A qualitative research 
design uncovers depiction, clarification, and the relationship between or among variables 
(Creswell, 2014). A quantitative data methodology was used to analyze the survey 
results. 
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GT was the appropriate research method given the flexibility in the methodology, 
the ability to code the literature, and the search for SMS attributes, and to further existing 
SMS theory (aligned with Birks & Mills, 2015; Wolfswinkel, Furtmueller, & Wilderom, 
2013). The iterative process allowed SMS attributes, safety management theory, and 
SMST to emerge. GT was especially useful because the scope of the research aimed to 
determine whether commercial space participants would recognize SMS attributes 
(Strauss & Corbin 1997; Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). 
A Delphi method was an acceptable method used to modify the needed questions. 
The selected SMEs worked independently from each other (Avella, 2016). This 
separation allowed for the totality of ideas to be considered equally until consensus was 
reached. The Delphi method resulted in the questions used for the SMS survey (Birks & 
Mills, 2015). 
Limitations 
The ESMM caused the study to have a few limitations. The methodology was 
time consuming for this research study. First, an extensive qualitative review of the 
pertinent available data was conducted to code the attributes for an SMS with high 
reliability. An existing survey instrument had not been published that tested for SMS 
attributes in a non-SMS environment. The qualitative review was necessary to help create 
the wording of the questions needed for the survey. 
The use of a Delphi method offered challenges. Choosing SMEs who were 
willing to participate posed issues. Additionally, once selected, most members 
participated in particular timelines. However, some members of the group did not meet 
the deadlines, creating timing issues with the integration of the new information. Any 
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issues with the Delphi group were addressed through multiple communications with the 
group. 
Research Design: Exploratory, Sequential, Mixed-Method 
Participation recruitment and data collection. On October 31, 2019, the 
University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the research 
study with the survey for distribution to human subjects (see Appendix B). Permission 
from the Aviation Department chair was obtained to facilitate email distribution during 
the survey pilot-study validation. Emails were sent to qualified pilots from the University 
Flight Department. Qualtrics.com was used to facilitate the pilot-study survey. 
Letters of support from two private commercial space companies were received as 
part of the IRB approval process. These letters allowed for more effective facilitation of 
the distribution of emails to the organization’s members. Additionally, LinkedIn and 
Facebook were used alone, with email, and through direct messaging to enable 
distribution to qualified individuals who met the specific requirements for the survey. 
Participants agreed to a consent form before answering the questions. If an 
individual did not agree to the consent form, they were precluded from starting the 
survey. The individuals who commenced with the survey were made aware that they 
could stop at any time without any adverse actions. Once the survey was completed, the 
results were stored on the university’s Qualtrics secure online servers under IRB security 
requirements. No personal data, including the internet service provider or global 
positioning system information, were retained at any point during the research. An 
electronic list of those sent the survey was maintained to prevent sending the survey 
twice. 
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ATLAS.ti v8 software, which is a qualitative computer-software package 
allowing researchers to manage textual, graphic, audio, and video data, was used. This 
software is well-known in social science research and enables researchers to group data 
into coded sections. This software stores data on the researcher’s personal computer for 
review and coding and augments the use of GT for analysis. 
Worldview of the researcher. The worldview of the researcher was shaped by 
more than 20 years of major airline safety experience in passenger airline operations. 
These safety experiences included safety investigation, safety protocol, and working with 
SMSs. This knowledge directed literature searches during the initial stages of the study, 
guiding which specific directions to begin the analysis. Experience levels may also 
introduce researcher bias to the data analysis. Every attempt was made to remain aware 
of the potential for bias during the study. The researcher remained mindful of the 
possibility of bias in the research and analysis as a means of mitigating any possible 
effects. 
Grounded theory. A GT coding process of SMS-related journal articles and 
personal communications with SMEs continued during this research. The use of GT 
helped uncover and advance research of an existing theory. GT revealed the theoretical 
concept of SMS used in one peer-reviewed journal article to describe the underlying 
ideas surrounding an SMS. In this research study, GT was used to select peer-reviewed 
literature, create codes for SMS attributes, and code SMS and HRT data. The iterative 
process of data review was used to develop descriptions or underlying foundations of 
SMS (Guetterman et al., 2019; Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). Reviewing and coding the 
literature was also accomplished using the computer program ATLAS.ti (v 8, 2018). 
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Articles not containing relevant information or data were discarded. This iterative process 
continued until sufficient data were coded to form a comprehensive representation of the 
required elements. Approximately 188 journal articles, books, PowerPoint presentations, 
and conference papers were reviewed. The researcher created codes to group similar 
concepts together and to help select descriptive wording for the SMS survey questions. 
One strength of a GT approach was discovery of an existing theory through data 
samplings (Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010). GT offered the opportunity to collate various 
types of information through numerous iterative rounds of coding. In this case, the codes 
fostered support for an existing theory (Glaser & Strauss 2017; Strauss & Corbin 1997). 
SMST, discussed by Moorkamp et al. (2014), was uncovered late in the research process. 
The study of commercial space participants required descriptive language for the SMS 
survey questions that were outside the traditional means of describing the elements. An 
example is, “the company has a safety management system,” which was changed to “the 
company has a formal safety program.” The use of the attributes of SMST supported the 
required descriptive language. Coding was used to standardize similar data for analysis 
through the use of keywords, gathering different perspectives under a comparable code 
(Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010; Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). 
Personal communications. The researcher had several brief emails and in-person 
personal communications with individuals who are SMEs in SMS and HROs. Email 
communications with Dr. Alan Stolzer helped with the descriptive terms for SMS 
attributes. In-person discussion with Nick Demidovich, Program Manager, Payloads and 
Technologies Officer, involved in SMS development for FAA/AST, were beneficial in 
framing any future implementation of SMS in commercial space. These discussions 
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assisted in guiding the research direction to augment the FAA/AST in a possible future 
SMS application in commercial space. 
Brief, insightful email discussions with Dr. Tim Vogus and Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe 
presented direction for the HRT questions used in the study. These communications 
contributed to the adoption of the Safety Organizing Scale (SOS) to capture HRT 
attributes for the research (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Delphi method. The Delphi method is a method of collecting and grouping 
informed opinions from a group of SMEs (Day & Bobeva, 2005). An effective Delphi 
method requires selecting a panel who were considered experts on the topics or issues 
that were the focus of the discussion (Day & Bobeva, 2005; Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007). The information accrued anonymously from each participant and was kept 
confidential. The results of each round were scrutinized and summarized, then returned to 
participants for further contemplation and responses. Routine emails were sent to the 
group to foster the completion of the Delphi method. This cycle continued until an 
overall consensus in the group was reached (as described by Biondo, Nekolaichuk, Stiles, 
Fainsinger, & Hagen, 2008). According to Avella (2016), the use of a Delphi method 
applies to several types of research methodologies that include a constructivist paradigm. 
The Delphi method may be particularly useful with GT. 
A panel of SMS experts was assembled, garnered through the literature review 
and personal contacts. The experts either had long academic/publishing histories with 
SMS, were considered experts in SMS by their practical knowledge and experiences or 
had researched the safety protocols for use with the FAA/AST. The members reviewed a 
list of questions from a validated scale published by Stolzer et al. (2018). These survey 
55 
questions were the starting point for the Delphi group. The group reworded the questions 
to capture the elements of an SMS without including traditional words or phrases 
customarily associated with an SMS. In other words, the members crafted SMS 
theoretical questions that would evaluate the acceptance of the attributes for the 
participants without using the descriptive terms of SMS in the questions. 
Each Delphi round took 7 days for the group to respond using a Word document 
and tracked changes to highlight their inputs. At the end of each round, the data were 
summarized, changes made to the existing questions, then returned to the Delphi group 
(Day & Bobeva, 2005). Agreement was determined through comments sent by each 
SME. The final round resulted in the completed list of SMS attribute questions. Each 
member was offered additional opportunities to respond with suggested changes. A 
consensus among the members was reached after three rounds, which is considered 
adequate (Skulmoski et al., 2007). Agreement on the wording emerged through additional 
changes or comments made by Delphi group members. Individual dialog with members 
confirmed agreement on the final questions. 
Survey instrument construction validation through the pilot study. A pilot 
study was necessary, given the changes to the original Stolzer et al. (2018) SMS 
questions. Additional IRB approval was received on December 8, 2019, before the pilot 
survey was initiated. The survey began at a Midwest collegiate flying university with a 
seasoned SMS program in place and through targeted contact made through approved 
social-media outlets. The survey was restricted to those who had proven experience 
operating in an SMS environment. Careful steps were taken to avoid duplicate survey 
takers. The researcher contacted participants through email generated from the 
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university’s flight department. Additional respondents who also operated in an SMS 
environment were contacted through social media to augment pilot-test-group 
respondents. 
After a 4-week testing period, the survey results were analyzed using SPSS (v. 
26) statistical software. A principal component analysis was performed. Questions that 
did not result in a factor loading value above 0.50 were removed from the list of 
questions. Additional exploratory factor analysis and principal factor analysis were 
conducted. The results of the scree plot show that the majority of questions loaded onto a 
single factor, labeled SMS attributes (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Scree plot from the pilot study. 
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The total variance explained also indicated a single factor with eigenvalue = 15.69 
and a variance of 65.4%, shown in Table 2. The next factor had eigenvalues of 1.480, 
explaining 6.16 % of the variance. The second eigenvalue factors captured a variety of 
questions that did not associate with or load to a single central idea. 
Table 2 
Variances and Eigenvalues of Factors Extracted for Pilot Study (Edited). 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalues Extraction sums of squared loadings 
Factor Total Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 15.699 65.411 65.411 15.362 64.010 64.010 
2 1.480 6.168 71.579    
3 1.005 4.189 75.768    
 
A parallel analysis was conducted that verified the use of one factor. The other 
factor loadings did not have a significant level of common elements. Therefore, the 
researcher elected to use a single factor for testing. Table 3 shows the results of the pilot 
study of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.833 (meritorious) test. Cronbach’s α values = .963 
were calculated, which showed strong internal validity. An alpha level above .70 and a 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin above 0.60 is considered to have an acceptable validity (Field, 
2018; Warner, 2012). Factor loadings of 0.50 and above were retained, which resulted in 
23 questions for the final SMS-attributes survey. An additional question related to SRM 
was included that had a factor value below 0.50. The questions were evenly distributed 
between the four SMS variables being surveyed. The results of the confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA; principal axis factoring) are in Appendix C. 
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Table 1 
Pilot Study Safety-Management System Theory Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin and Bartlett’s Test 
of Sphericity 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy Approx. chi-square df Sig. 
.889 1051.075 276 .000 
Note. Variables in the quantitative analysis. 
Variables in the quantitative analysis. The resulting Organizational Safety 
Attribute Awareness Survey had 35 questions that consisted of 24 SMS attributes 
(selected from the pilot-study results), nine HRT questions adopted from Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007), and two demographic questions. In total, nine dependent variables (four 
for SMS and five for HRT) plus two independent variables were analyzed. Table 4 shows 
a listing of the questions. 
Table 4 
List of Factors and Variables With Applicable Questions Used in the Survey 
Factors Predictor variable Survey questions 
Safety management system theory Policy (P) 2, 3, 5, 5.1, 6, 8 
Risk (SRM) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Assurance (SA) 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 9 
Promotion (SP) 1, 2.2, 3, 5, 6 
High reliability theory Preoccupation with Failure PF 1- 2 
Reluctance to Simplify RS 1- SO 1 
Sensitivity to Operation SO 2 
Commitment to Resilience CR 1- 2 
Defer to Expertise DE 1- 2 
Demographics Years of Experience D 1 
Role in Organization D 2 
Note. PF = Preoccupation with Failure, RS = Reluctance to Simplify, SO = Sensitivity to the Operations, 
CR = Commitment to Resilience, DE  = Deference to Expertise, D = Demography. 
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Target population and sample. The two sample groups comprised a 
representative convenience sampling of individuals who, through their employer and 
experiences, characterized the larger population. Commercial space participants were 
contacted directly through an individual in their organization. Airline participants were 
contacted through a direct means including email, direct messenger in LinkedIn or 
Facebook, and posting in member-only aviation Facebook groups. The two groups were 
independent of each other. 
Commercial space. Letters of support were received from two private 
commercial space companies that allowed surveying of employees. An email containing 
an introduction letter with URL links to the survey were sent to the contact person for 
further companywide distribution. All communications with the respective participants 
were controlled by the companies. 
Additional convenience sample representative participants were contacted directly 
through LinkedIn and targeted emails. Individuals from the commercial space industry 
who received survey invitations came from Jet Propulsion Labs, The Rocket Company, 
SpaceX, Blue Origin, United Launch Alliance, and the Aerospace Corporation. 
Organizations with safety-management systems. The airline group included 
those who work for an airline with an SMS as the formal safety protocol. Participants in 
the study included pilots, flight attendants, and members of staff and management. An 
assumption was made that each of participant had knowledge and experience in SMS 
components. Experience was defined as working in an SMS environment. Airline 
individuals who were sent survey invitations worked at American Airlines, Southwest 
Airlines, United Airlines, and Delta Air Lines. 
60 
Social media. The acceptance of social media in higher education research has 
grown in recent years (Al-Qaysi, Mohamad-Nordin, & Al-Emran, 2020; Gruzd, Staves, 
& Wilk, 2012; Rowlands, Nicholas, Russell, Canty, & Watkinson, 2011). However, one 
concern with the use of social media in conducting research was the sizable time 
requirement needed to gather response data (Gruzd et al., 2012). The social-media 
platforms of LinkedIn and Facebook, as well as direct email, were used to augment the 
survey data for this research. Both social media platforms allowed for the specific 
selection of individuals who met the experience criteria necessary for the survey. An 
IRB-approved introduction letter was used with a URL link to the Qualtrics survey site 
shown in Appendix D. Targeted selections of survey participants lowered the 
opportunities for testing-bias from unqualified individuals. 
Power analysis for sample size. A power analysis for multivariate analysis of 
variance with two levels and two dependent variables was conducted in G*Power to 
determine sufficient sample size for the research with values of ⍺ = .05, a power of 0.95, 
and a large effect size (f2 = 0.962; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013). Based on the 
assumptions mentioned previously, an acceptable sample size was calculated to be |n = 
24|. The details of the power calculation appear in Appendix E. Kline (2015) stated that 
10 to 20 participants per parameter was a good indication of adequate power in the 
sample size. 
Demographic questions. Two demographic questions were used as independent 
variables. The first question inquired about the role with which the participant identified 
in the organization. The second asked the length of time the participant had been in the 
industry. The surveys were used in separate industries with different organizational 
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structures or management levels. A broadly worded question was used to capture the 
participant’s understanding of the two questions. The survey question measuring 
participant years in the industry was designed to ascertain the length of time in the 
industry rather than the organization. These questions offered further insights into how 
these variables may have affected the dependent variables in the study. 
Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument was used to measure the discussed variables (see Appendix 
F). All questions used a 7-point Likert-style scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree). An odd number of answer choices was used to allow the survey taker to make a 
natural choice in their selection (Heiberger & Robbins, 2014; Pimentel, 2010). An 
exception were the demographic questions, which used a designed measurement specific 
to the information being gathered. Cronbach’s α was used to measure the reliability of the 
scales. A value of α > .70 was used to measure the reliability of the variables used in the 
study (Field, 2018; Warner, 2012). 
Safety management system surveys. Stolzer et al. (2018) published a survey 
developed for the FAA to measure the effectiveness of SMS in organizations. The 
questions asked participants to respond using a Likert-type scale about their 
understandings of the SMS elements of safety policy, safety-risk management, safety 
assurance, and safety promotion. An SMS had been instituted in these organizations for 
longer than 12 months before participants took part in the survey. The published 
statistical analysis from the Stolzer et al. survey resulted in the values of comparative fit 
index (CFI) = 0.96 and root meant square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.05. 
These results show strong goodness-of-fit for the survey. These SMS questions with the 
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addition of one question from Adjekum (2017) were the base questions used by the 
Delphi group to create the SMS attribute-based questions used in this study. A letter of 
agreement from the publisher is found in Appendix G. 
High-reliability theory. The SOS was developed by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) 
based on the attributes of HRT. This survey was designed to measure the recognition of 
HRT attributes through mindfulness of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify 
operations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise 
of nurses in medical organizations. The published SOS survey reported excellent 
goodness of fit across these three indices (CFI = 0.964, incremental fit index = 0.964, 
RMSEA = 0.05) and a Cronbach’s α of .88 (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). The survey has 
been translated into various languages and further analyzed for validation (Ausserhofer, 
Schubert, Blegen, De Geest, & Schwendimann, 2013). 
Two HRT questions were modified to fit the target research participants. The 
preoccupation with failure question—“when giving report to an oncoming nurse, we 
usually discuss what to look out for”—was substituted with “the organization has a good 
‘roadmap’ of each other’s talents and skills.” Additionally, the word “patient” was 
removed from “when a patient crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our collective expertise to 
attempt to resolve it.” A CFA was conducted. The results of a CFA indicated a single 
factor for the nine questions. Table 5 shows a list of the factor matrix results for the HRT 
questions in the study. These HRT questions resulted in Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.83 
(meritorious) which indicated adequate sampling and a Cronbach’s α = .87 value 
resulting in good internal consistency. A letter of agreement from the publisher is found 
in Appendix H. 
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Table 5 
High Reliability Theory Factor Matrix 
High reliability theory questions  Factor 
Preoccupation with Failure  0.74 
Preoccupation with Failure  0.63 
Reluctance to Simplify  0.58 
Sensitivity to the Operation  0.65 
Sensitivity to the Operation  0.59 
Commitment to Resilience  0.65 
Commitment to Resilience  0.68 
Deference to Expertise  0.70 
Deference to Expertise  0.65 
Note. Extraction method: Principal axis factoring, 1 factor extracted. 5 iterations required. 
The SOS questions and the adjustment made to the HRT questions for this study 
are listed in Table 6. 
Statistical Analysis 
Various test statistics were used for analysis related to achieving the research 
objectives and answering the research questions. Significance in mean attributes of 
perceptions on items was assessed using independent t-test and analysis of variances 
(ANOVA). Structural equation modeling (SEM) measurement model (MM) was used to 
determine the predictive relationships between measured variables and the overarching 
construct of SMS. The SEM-MM was also used to assess the goodness-of-fit of 
measurement models from the collected data. 
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Table 6 
Safety Organizing Scale and High Reliability Theory Questions 
HRT dimension Safety organizing scale questions HRT questions used in research 
Preoccupation with 
Failure 
When giving a report to oncoming 
nurses, we usually discuss what to 
look out 
The organization has a good 
“roadmap” of each other’s talents and 
skills 
We spend time identifying activities 
we do not want to go wrong 
We spend time identifying activities 




We discuss alternatives as to how to 
go about normal work activities 
We discuss alternatives as to how to go 
about normal work activities 
Sensitivity to 
operations 
We have a good “map” of each 
person’s talents and skills 
We have a good “map” of each 
person’s talents and skills 
We discuss our unique skills with each 
other so that we know who has 
relevant specialized skills and 
knowledge 
We discuss our unique skills with each 
other so that we know who has 




We talk about mistakes and ways to 
learn from them 
We talk about mistakes and ways to 
learn from them 
When an error happens, we discuss 
how we could have prevented them 
When an error happens, we discuss 
how we could have prevented them 
Deference to 
expertise 
When attempting to solve a problem, 
we take advantage of the unique skills 
of our colleagues 
When attempting to solve a problem, 
we take advantage of the unique skills 
of our colleagues 
When a patient crisis occurs, we 
rapidly pool our collective expertise to 
attempt to resolve it 
When a crisis occurs, we rapidly pool 
our collective expertise to attempt to 
resolve it 
Note. From The Safety Organizing Scale: Development and Validation of a Behavioral Measure of Safety 
Culture in Hospital Nursing Units, by T. J. Vogus & K. M. Sutcliffe, 2007, Medical Care, 45, p. 48. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.mlr.0000244635.61178.7a 
Robust technique in the form of 5000 bootstrap samples with Bias Corrected 
Accelerated (BCa) confidence interval (95%) was used for the SEM and predictive 
analysis. This mediated the potential violations of the assumptions of linearity due to the 
relatively small sample size (Fields, 2018). The results of the qualitative survey were 
downloaded from the Qualtrics software under the University of North Dakota license. 
Statistical analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS (v. 26) and IBM AMOS Graphic (v. 
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23) software. A priori statistical significance was set at .05 for the ANOVA and 
independent t-test. 
The data from the responses were loaded into the SPSS AMOS software and a 
first-order CFA was conducted to determine the strength of relationship between items 
and the explanatory factors. This approach graphically displayed the predictive 
relationships between items and latent constructs. Once a good fit was determined, 
averaged variance extracted (AVE) reliability and construct validity were calculated for 
the items that loaded for the model. The following model-fit indices were analyzed: chi-
squared (χ2), RMSEA, CFI, and Tucker–Lewis Index (TLI). An RMSEA < 0.05 would 
indicate a good fit; 0.05 ≤ RMSEA ≥ 0.10 a moderate fit; and < 0.10 a bad fit (Hu & 
Bentley, 1998). CFI > 0.95 indicated a great fit, > 0.90 a traditional fit, and > 0.80 
indicates acceptable fit. For TLI, values greater than 0.95 implied a good model fit 
(Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). An AVE > 0.50 and a CR > 0.70 is considered 




There were two goals for this research study: to establish a method to introduce a 
SMS as a standard formal safety protocol for commercial space organizations and to 
determine whether HRT attributes exist in an airline SMS environment. The following 
questions addressed the research goals: 
1. What is the validity and reliability of a measurement instrument that measures 
the overarching concept of SMS in aviation and commercial space 
organizations? 
2. What are the differences in the mean responses of participants from 
commercial space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an SMS on 
factors underlying SMS? 
3. What are the differences in the mean responses of participants from 
commercial space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an SMS on 
factors underlying HRT? 
Statistically significant differences in mean values of the SMS and HRT elements 
recognized by participants were assessed using independent t-test and one-way ANOVA. 
The SEM-MM measured the variables of the overarching construct of SMS. Normality in 
the data was assumed using a robust corrected accelerated bootstrap at the 95% 
confidence level. 
Survey Responses 
Descriptive statistics were conducted including mean, standard deviation, 
standard normal error of the mean (using SEM), test for normality (skewness and 
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kurtosis), and histograms with normal curves. Table 7 shows the commercial space and 
airline survey-participant demographic results. 
Table 7 
Survey Subject Demographic Results 
 Commercial space Airlines 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Years in industry     
0 to 5 7 12 2 2 
5 to 10 3 5 3 3 
10 to 15 9 15 5 5 
15+ 40 68 79 90 
Role in the organization     
Nonsupervisor 25 42  37 42 
1st-level supervisor 9 15 32 36 
Manager 10 17 16 18 
Senior manager 15 25 3 3 
 
The majority of participants (68%) have been in the commercial space industry 
for 15 years or more. Approximately 20% of participants had been in the industry under 
10 years. More than  40% of those surveyed identified their position as being in a 
nonsupervisory role. These data suggest that commercial space may have newer members 
in the industry, supporting the notion of growth. Of note, however, was that 
approximately 25% of responders identified themselves as senior managers. It was 
conceivable that the organizational structure in commercial space had a higher number of 
senior managers per number of employees. It was also possible that a high percentage of 
the survey participants were senior managers. 
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The data for the airline group suggested that a larger percentage of participants 
skewed toward the higher end (90%) of years worked in the industry (15 or more years). 
These results indicated that those working at a major airline in the United States had been 
working in the industry for longer than those in the commercial space industry, 
suggesting an experienced workforce. A higher number of years in the industry may lead 
to a stronger understanding of SMS in the group. Results indicated that 78% of 
respondents identified as nonsupervisory or first-level supervisors for the airline group. 
Senior managers and managers comprised 21% of the group, which may include chief 
pilots, department leads, or other levels of upper management. 
Research Question 1 
Items relating to the modified SMS-attribute questions used in the psychometric 
factor Organization Safety Attribute Awareness Survey derived from the Delphi group 
using the Stolzer et al. (2018) survey as base questions. The following model fit indices 
were analyzed via IBM SPSS (v. 26) and IBM AMOS Graphic (v. 23): chi-squared (χ2), 
RMSEA, CFI, and TLI. Figure 12 depicts a best fit model produced through the SEM-
MM method. The individual SMS elements (safety policy, safety risk management, 
safety assurance, and safety promotion) best fit models and maximum likelihood 
estimates of the SMS variable including standard regression weight estimates (SRW Est), 
standard error (S.E.), beta (β) appear in Table 8. The SEM resulted in an χ2 (2, 151) = 
6.59, p < .05, suggesting a strong model. The RMSEA = 0.023, TLI = 0.958, and CFI = 
0.992 also confirmed a strong model fit. The individual SMS elements max likelihood 
estimates are found in Appendix I. 
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Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Safety Management System Variables Using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis-Path Analysis 
Variable SRW Est S.E. p β R2 X2 TLI CFI 
Safety Policy 0.89 0.77 0.008 0.89 0.79 9.59 0.88 0.98 
Safety Risk 0.90 0.79 0.022 0.89 0.79 7.65 0.92 0.98 
Safety Assurance 0.89 0.83 0.007 0.91 0.83 9.90 0.91 0.98 
Safety Promotion 0.89 0.79 0.370 0.89 0.79 5.39 0.99 0.99 
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Convergent validity of the model elements was determined by calculating the 




Furthermore, the CR using the formula:  
CR	 =
(∑𝜆!)"
(∑ 𝜆!)" 	+ 	(∑ 𝜖!)
 
was used for the model. The AVE is a validity measurement of the levels of variance 
captured during modeling due to measurement error assessing the discriminate validity of 
the model (Hair et al., 2010). An Excel spreadsheet was used to calculate the AVE and 
CR data from the structural equation final mode. Table 9 shows the computed AVE 
threshold > 0.50 and the CR threshold > 0.70 results for the four elements of safety 
policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. These indicated 
good validity and reliability for the questions used in the final model (Hair et at., 2010). 
Table 9 
Average Variance Extracted and Composite Reliability for the elements of Safety 
Management Systems 
SMST Average variance extracted Composite reliability 
Safety policy 0.64 0.88 
Safety Risk 0.69 0.90 
Safety assurance 0.73 0.91 
Safety promotion 0.68 0.91 
Note. SMST = Safety management system theory. 
The results of the SEM-MM demonstrated acceptable loading with χ2, RMSEA, 
TLI, CFI, AVE, and CR values. Those SMS questions that showed high loading values 
for SMST variables were used to create the survey instrument. Possessing the ability to 
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determine which SMS elements require additional emphasis in an organization may be 
helpful to senior management to more efficiently implement an SMS program. The 
researcher hoped this survey would offer the FAA/AST accurate results to ascertain 
effective future implementation of SMS in the industry. Dependable survey results may 
also assist commercial space companies to determine which current safety elements will 
require additional resources accurately. The FAA/AST may also survey commercial 
space companies to offer assistance with near-term volunteer implementation of SMS. 
Organizations may incorporate the results of this survey to make internal safety 
adjustments more quickly and with greater accuracy. 
Results from Research Questions 2 and 3 
The mean values of the elements of SMST were calculated from the questions 
identified during the first-order CFA using the SEM approach (maximum likelihood 
estimation). Mean values were calculated from the HRT questions adopted from Vogus 
and Sutcliffe (2007). Separate independent sample t-tests were conducted to examine 
whether statistically significant differences in mean responses for the elements existed 
between the airlines and commercial space groups (see Appendices J and K). The data 
met normality assumptions through the rigorous corrected accelerated bootstrapping at 
the 5,000 iterations level with a  confidence interval (CI) of 95%. Cohen’s d was 
calculated with the following formula: 
SDpooled = √[(SD12+ SD22) / 2], 
d = M1–M2/SDpooled.  
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According to Cohen (1988), d ≥ 0.2 indicates a small effect size, d ≥ 0.5 indicates a 
medium effect size, and d ≥ 0.8 indicates a large effect size for variables, in this case 
SMST. 
Research Question 2 
The results found in Table 10 represent the differences between the groups’ SMS 
mean values. These results suggested that respondents in the airline group exhibited an 
excellent understanding of the questions asked in the SMS-attribute survey. The 
descriptive statistics indicated that 90% of airline respondents had more than 15 years in 
the industry. These data suggested that the airline group provided a good indicator of 
acceptance of SMS attributes in the survey questions. 
Table 10 
Safety Management System Theory Elements Between-Group Statistics 
Element Type N Mean Std. dev. Significance Cohen’s d 
SafetyPolicy airlines 91 6.00 1.06   
comm space 61 5.86 0.78 .381  
SafetyRiskMgt airlines 91 5.89 1.13   
comm space 62 5.88 0.77 .946  
SafetyAssurance airlines 91 5.91 1.13   
comm space 62 5.51 1.03 .027 0.37 
SafetyPromotion airlines 90 5.69 1.13   
comm space 60 5.69 0.93 .990  
 
The overall outcomes show similar mean values between the airline and 
commercial space groups, excluding the safety assurance element. The difference in 
survey responses for safety assurance was statistically significant, t(151) = 2.23, p = .027, 
d = 0.37 denoting a small effect size. This result indicated that airline respondents had a 
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higher recognition of assurance than commercial space participants. However, overall 
results suggested roughly equal response values between members of the airline and 
commercial space groups. The similar outcomes suggested two important matters. First, 
the results indicated that the SMS characteristic survey to answer Research Question 1 
was suitable in determining SMS attributes based on the higher mean values from the 
airline group. Second, the commercial space group appeared to identify with the SMS 
attributes at similar levels when compared to the airline group. These results suggest a 
baseline understanding of the SMS attributes by the group. 
The 95% confidence interval error bars appear in the Figure 13 overlap suggesting 
that large differences in mean values between groups were not prevalent for the SMS 
elements. Figure 13 further represents that the two groups responded to the SMST 
attributes at comparable levels (aligned with Field, 2018).  
 
Figure 13. Comparison of safety management system theory mean values with 95% 
confidence interval error bars. 
 
Furthermore, the airline participants’ high results implied that the SMS survey accurately 
tested for elements of an SMS. Additionally, the similar response levels from the 















commercial space group may indicate that SMS elements exist, in some form, in the 
organizations. The independent-sample test full results appear in Appendices E and F. 
Figure 13 represents the mean values for the four SMST elements with error bars 
for direct comparison between the airline and commercial space groups. Safety assurance 
resulted in the only statistically significant difference in mean values between the two 
groups. Cohen’s d suggested a small effect on the mean difference between the airline 
and commercials space groups. Safety policy, safety risk management, and safety 
promotion did not have statistically significant differences between groups. Figure 13 
depicts comparable high mean values of SMS elements between the two groups. A 
plausible explanation for this is that the commercial space group recognized the SMS 
features as universal formal safety-system attributes. It was also likely that commercial 
space participants responded positively to the questions in general. The data supported 
the notion that the testing for SMST was possible in organizations without an active 
SMS. These results may offer assistance in the future testing of SMS in commercial 
space organizations through the establishment of baseline values used as a comparison 
for organizations in the commercial space industry. 
Safety Management System Theory Hypotheses Testing 
There is no difference in mean value of items that measure safety policy among 
commercials space organizations without SMS and airlines with an SMS (H0a). 
No statistically significant differences emerged in mean values between the airline 
group and the commercial space group regarding safety policy. This resulted in a failure 
to reject the null hypothesis. In an SMS, safety policy contains the structure of the overall 
formal protocol. It lists many of the required elements and practices of the SMS. This 
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concept appears to be ubiquitous to other safety systems. Therefore, it is understood by 
commercial space respondents who were not familiar with an SMS or the specific 
attributes of SMST. 
There is no difference in mean value of items that measure safety risk 
management among commercials space organizations without an SMS and 
airlines with an SMS (Hob). 
Results indicated no significant differences emerged in mean values between 
groups on safety risk management, indicating acceptance of the null hypothesis. Safety 
risk management appears to be a universal concept in operations with a degree of risk. 
The mean results suggested that this concept was easily identifiable for the commercial 
space group as a standard component of a formal safety protocol. 
There is no difference in mean value of items that measure safety assurance 
among commercials space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an 
SMS (Hoc). 
The results indicated that a statistically significant difference emerged between 
the mean values for the airline and commercial space groups on safety assurance t(151) = 
0.07, p = .025, d = 0.37. These results further indicated a small effect size. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. Safety assurance included methods to determine the 
effectiveness of the SMS. Although the specific SMST-attribute question results from the 
commercial space group were lower than those of the airline group, the concept of 
measuring a safety program’s effectiveness was recognized at similar levels by both 
groups. 
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There is no difference in mean value of items that measure safety promotion 
among commercials space organizations without an SMS and airlines with an 
SMS (H0d). 
Results indicated no significant differences emerged in mean values between 
groups on safety risk management, indicating a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The 
SMS element of safety promotion encompasses safety-protocol training and 
communication of operations information. The intent of this element is to foster a 
positive safety culture. Results suggested these functions may be universal and known to 
respondents from the commercial space group. 
SMS Survey Summary 
Survey results for the airline group showed high mean levels for the four SMS 
elements of safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety 
promotion. Airline respondents appeared to have good familiarity with the four elements 
of an SMS and responded accordingly to the survey questions. For this research, the 
airline group helped validate the SMS survey question and created a baseline 
measurement used for comparison with the commercial space group. Three of the four 
SMS elements did not have significant differences between the airline and commercial 
space groups. Results suggested that the commercial space subjects responded at similar 
levels to the airline groups for these elements. Additionally, the attributes of SMST 
appear to be recognizable and acceptable to the commercial space group. 
Further, the mean values for safety assurance did not show a difference larger 
than one standard deviation. This difference value may indicate that commercial space 
participants responded, in general, at a roughly similar level to the airline group. 
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Commercial space respondents may have a predisposition to acceptance of the elements 
indicated in an SMS, given the current safety protocols in place in their organizations. 
Research Question 3 
Survey responses for HRT questions on preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, and sensitivity to the operations were statistically significant between the two 
groups. Table 11 illustrates the HRT group-mean statistics for comparison. 
Table 11 
High-Reliability Theory Element Between Group Statistics 
Element Type Mean Std. Dev Significance Cohen’s d 
Preoccupation 
with failure 
airlines 5.97 0.97   
commercial space 5.32 1.23 .000 0.59 
Reluctance to 
simplify 
airlines 5.89 1.13   
commercial space 5.19 1.42 .001 0.61 
Sensitivity to the 
operation 
airlines 4.95 1.22   
commercial space 4.45 1.48 .023 0.48 
Commitment to 
Resilience  
airlines 6.33 1.03   
commercial space 6.16 0.93 .301  
Deference to 
Expertise 
airlines 5.89 1.07   
commercial space 5.66 1.24 .225  
 
The mean value differences between the airline group and the commercial space 
group for preoccupation with failure resulted in a statistically significant value of t(151) = 
3.65, p < .00. Cohen’s d = 0.78, which denoted a medium effect size. The airline group 
reacted to preoccupation with failure at a higher mean level than the commercial space 
group. HRT was not a formal safety protocol and not something members of the groups 
may have recognized. Regardless, each group had responses that suggested the HRT 
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element was imbued in the existing culture. The potential failure awareness captured in 
the HRT survey questions resonated with both groups. 
Similarly, the data showed differences in values between the two groups for 
reluctance to simplify, t(151) = 3.82, p < .00. Cohen’s d = 0.61 denoted a medium effect 
size. The HRT survey question, “we discuss alternatives as to how we go about our 
normal work activities,” may not be an element that had shared significance between the 
groups. The results suggest that the airline group may have operational latitude in job 
tasks that the commercial space group does not. Reluctance to simplify had the second-
lowest response mean value for commercial space. The results suggest that the nature of 
commercial space operations may not allow for any deviation for standard protocols. 
Additionally, sensitivity to the operations had a statistically significant difference 
in mean values between the two groups t(151) = 2.29, p = .23. Cohen’s d = 0.48, which is 
a small effect. In contrast, sensitivity to operations has the lowest value collectively. This 
HRT element involved a holistic operations view that measures the interaction of the 
members, external influences, with the sharing of information in the organization. The 
results suggest that discussing differences in individual skill sets was not a common 
practice for either group. Ambiguity in the wording may also have influenced lower 
results. The airline and commercial space groups may comprise somewhat 
homogeneously trained individuals. The questions delved into concepts that the groups 
appear not to have identified with given possible equal levels of education and 
experience. 
The remaining two HRT attributes, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise, did not have statistically significant differences between the groups. Of interest 
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were the values for commitment to resilience. This HRT characteristic resulted in the 
highest mean values of the five HRT attributes for both groups. Results suggested that 
participants in both groups identified with the concepts of discussing errors and methods 
for error prevention. 
Deference to expertise had the second collective highest mean values for the 
groups. Both appeared to identify with the concept of advocating for consultation with an 
expert during problem-solving. Additionally, collaborative problem solving in the group 
seemed to be an HRT element with measured understanding. 
The HRT element mean values with 95% confidence interval error bars appear in 
Figure 14 for comparison between the airline and commercial space groups. Results 
confirmed that preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to the 
operation had statistically significant differences between mean values for the airline and 
commercial space group respondents.  
 
Figure 14. Comparison of high reliability theory mean values with 95% confident 
























Of note, however, are similarities in overall results, suggesting the two groups view HRT 
elements in roughly the same manner. This impression may suggest that high-risk 
operation-based organizations equally embrace HRT attributes without specific 
knowledge of the components. For the airlines, the results indicated that HRT attributes 
can exist in an SMS environment. 
High reliability theory hypotheses results. 
There is no difference in the mean values of items that measure preoccupation 
with failure among commercial space organization without an SMS and airlines 
with an SMS (H0e). 
Results indicated a significant difference emerged in mean values between groups 
on preoccupation with failure (t[151] = 3.65, p < .001), d = 0.59. Consequently, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. This element encompassed the requirement for members to be 
attentive to operational anomalies. Despite a difference in mean values, each group 
responded with high overall values, suggesting each group collectively accepted this 
HRT element. 
There is no difference in the mean values of items that reluctance to simplify 
among commercial space organization without an SMS and airlines with an SMS 
(H0f). 
Results indicated a significant difference emerged in mean values between groups 
concerning a reluctance to simplify the operation (t[151] = 3.82, p < 0.00), d = 0.61. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Reluctance to simplify refers to the ability to 
challenge an operational status quo and interrogate current operating procedures seeking 
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any weaknesses. The results, although statistically different between groups, suggested 
the groups identified with the notion of persistent vigilance. 
There is no difference in the mean values of items that measure sensitivity to the 
operation among commercial space organization without an SMS and airlines 
with an SMS (H0g). 
Results indicated a significant difference emerged in mean values between the 
groups with sensitivity to the operation. The null hypothesis was rejected. Of note are the 
low collective mean responses for each group. Sensitivity to the operations revolves 
around how processes are functioning. The data suggested neither group responded to 
this HRT element. However, this characteristic may seemingly be apropos of many high-
risk operations. A possible explanation includes participants’ understanding of the 
wording of the questions. 
There is no difference in the mean values of items that resilience in the operation 
among commercial space organization without an SMS and airlines with an SMS 
(Hoh). 
Results indicated no significant difference emerged in mean values between 
groups on the commitment to resilience in operations. Therefore, there was a failure to 
reject the null. Resilience includes the actions of the organization before, during, and 
after an event. Both groups responded at the highest level to this HRT concept. 
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There is no difference in the mean values of items that measure deference to 
expertise among commercial space organization without an SMS and airlines with 
an SMS (H0i). 
Results indicated no significant difference emerged in mean values between 
groups on deference to expertise resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
Results indicated that both groups recognized this HRT characteristic. Participants 
recognized the idea of turning to an individual who has higher knowledge during times of 
need. 
HRT survey summary. Results suggested the airline respondents identified with 
the HRT attributes of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, commitment to 
resilience, and deference to expertise at higher levels that would indicate acceptance of 
the concepts. The three factors had values above 5.88 on a 7.0 Likert-type scale. 
Sensitivity to the operation had the lowest level of recognition. 
HRT attributes were not principles in which the two groups had known 
backgrounds or training. Results suggested that the airline and commercial space 
industries recognized HRT characteristics at roughly the same frequency. This may 
indicate similar patterns of understanding with operations that encompass a level of risk. 
Demographic Hypotheses H0j–H0m 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare mean values for the airline and 
commercial space groups for management level and time in the industry. All data were 
assumed normally distributed using corrected accelerated bootstrap at 5,000 iterations 
with the CI 95%. 
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There is no difference in the mean values of perception of SMST in terms of the 
level of management in the industry in the test groups (H0j). 
No statistically significant effects emerged from the level of management, 
resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. Results suggested that the level of 
management role was not statistically significant for SMST elements. Both groups 
responded to SMST survey questions at a similar level. The management role was not an 
indicator of acceptance or rejection. The higher numbers of nonmanagers may skew these 
results based on those who participated in the survey. These results may have also 
indicated that SMST elements were accepted regardless of role in the organization. 
There is no difference in the mean values of perception of SMST in terms of the 
length of time in the industry in the test groups (H0k). 
The results did not indicate a statistically significant effect on the groups resulting 
in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The length of time did not affect response levels 
in answering SMST questions. SMS elements were viewed in the same fashion regardless 
of time in the industry. 
There is no difference in mean values of perception of HRT in terms of the 
management role in the organizations in the test groups (H0l). 
Results indicated two statistically significant effects emerged in mean differences. 
The null hypothesis was rejected. The first significant effect was sensitivity to the 
operation, F(3, 152) = 3.10, p = .029. The post hoc pairwise comparison did not indicate 
a significant effect level among the roles of management. 
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The second statistically significant effect was with deference to expertise F(3, 
152) = 3.11, p = .028. A post hoc Tamhane pairwise comparison (used here for unequal 
size groups) indicated a significant influence (p = .003) between senior manager and 
those in nonsupervisory roles. This result suggested that senior managers may be more 
sensitive to HRT characteristics than nonsupervisory personnel. 
There is no difference in mean values of perception of HRT in terms of length of 
time in the industry in the organization in the test groups (H0m). 
No statistically significant differences emerged between the groups in the 
industry. Therefore, there was a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The results suggested 
that the length of time participants had been in their respective sectors did not affect their 
recognition of HRT attributes. 
SMST and HRT 
The researcher selected an acceptable mean value above 4.0 to depict a positive 
reaction to the components. This value represented a mean higher than “neither agree nor 
disagree” and was greater than the average of 3.5 for a 7-point Likert-style scale. All 
SMS mean values for the commercial space group resulted in outcomes above 4.00. 
These mean value results, coupled with the statistical analysis, suggested SMS attributes 
may be safety fundamental elements that the commercial space respondents recognized 
and acknowledged. 
The highest mean value for the commercial space group was safety risk 
management (5.88), and the lowest was safety assurance (5.51). The SMS mean values 
for the commercial space group were similar to the airline group’s results. A comparison 
of the airline group means indicated a strong acceptance of the SMS attributes with mean 
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values above 5.60. Coupling these mean results from the airline group with AVE values 
(> 0.50) and the CR values (> 0.70) from the SEM-PA analysis suggested this survey 
instrument can determine the existence of SMS elements in organizations. Table 12 
depicts the means and standard deviations for each of the SMST and HRT elements for 
commercial space and airline groups. The results from using this survey may offer 
assistance to the FAA/AST in bringing SMS to commercial space companies in the 
future. The use of study results provides increased efficiencies of implementation by 
determining which SMS elements require additional focus when implementing an SMS 
as a formal safety protocol. 
Table 12 
Mean Value Comparison for Safety Management System theory and High Reliability 
Organization 
Safety management system theory 
Element 
Comm space Std. deviation 
Acceptance 
level Airline Std. deviation 
Safety policy 5.86 0.78 4.00 6.00 1.06 
Safety risk  5.88 0.77 4.00 5.89 1.13 
Safety assurance 5.51 1.03 4.00 5.91 1.13 
Safety promotion 5.69 0.93 4.00 5.69 1.13 
High reliability theory 
Preoccupation with failure 5.32 1.23 4.00 5.97 0.96 
Reluctance to simplify 5.19 1.42 4.00 5.89 1.13 
Sensitivity to the operation 4.45 1.48 4.00 4.95 1.22 
Resilience in the operation 6.33 1.02 4.00 6.16 0.92 
Deference to expertise 5.66 1.24 4.00 5.89 1.06 
Note: A value above 4.0 was considered to denote acceptance of the attribute. 
HRT mean values of the airline-group surveyed participants seen in Table 12 
revealed mixed results. The highest mean value was resilience in operations (6.16) and 
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the lowest was sensitivity to the operation (4.71). High acceptance of a commitment to 
resilience may stem from the repetitive risky nature of the airline industry. Operational 
mistakes may cause incidents or accidents to occur. The HRT questions used for 
resilience to the operation focused on errors, how to learn from, and prevent them in 
future operations. Results suggested the airline group identified with this concept, making 
dynamic decisions to small portions of overall operations based on a continuous stream 
of new data. 
An example may be the control inputs that a pilot-in-command makes to flight 
controls during routine landings. The pilot needs to make constant micro adjustments to 
compensate for changing conditions such as wind, weather, and traffic conditions, 
whereas the respective low values for reluctance to simplify may be explained by the 
sampling of participants in the airlines or the wording of the survey questions used for 
this HRT element. This attribute seems to conflict with reluctance to simplify, as both 
HRT attributes imply an ability to monitor, measure, and adjust to the active operation. 
Commercial space and airlines are sensitive to failures. Commercial space 
operations, whether rocket launches or satellite manufacturing, require large capital 
expenditures that demand high levels of competency and resilience. Qualities such as 
these are necessary to continue an endeavor that has considerable potential economic and 
human risks to achieve success. However, these hazards are at a much higher level than 
the airlines, which have matured over time. The overall results of the analysis suggested 
that commercial space participants recognized the attributes of an SMS. Additionally, the 
study results indicated that airline group participants responded to the HRT attributes at 
varying positive levels. 
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Summary 
The first purpose of this study was to determine whether the attributes of SMST 
exist in commercial space organizations. To that end, a subset of SMST attributes, i.e., 
safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety policy, was found in 
current organizations. As a consequence, as the industry develops, the implementation of 
SMS in commercial space can be reasonably expected to be facilitated by quantifying the 
presence of these attributes. 
The second purpose was to determine whether characteristics of HRT can be 
found in extant SMS organizations in the airline industry. This study showed that the 
following qualities could be found in such organizations: (1) resilience in the operations, 
(2) preoccupation with failure, (3) reluctance to simplify, (4) deference to expertise. This 
finding expands the existing body of knowledge regarding HRT, proving that these 




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
An ESMM design was used in this research project. Three areas required 
emphasis. The first was to validate a survey instrument used to identify SMST attributes 
for commercial space organizations. The second was to evaluate whether employees of 
commercial space organizations recognized the attributes of a SMS. The third area of 
focus was to determine whether HRT qualities existed among members of the airlines. In 
this study, the researcher attempted to create benchmark levels of understanding of 
SMST and HRT in the testing groups. GT was used in the literature review, in coding 
SMS attributes for survey questions, and to search for existing theory to develop. 
Robust technique in the form of 5000 bootstrap samples with Bias Corrected 
Accelerated (BCa) confidence interval (95%) was used for the SEM and predictive 
analysis. SEM allowed for adjustments to the SMS element questions resulting in the 
final study. The outcome model had validity and reliability above the benchmark values 
of AVE > 0.70 and CR > 0.50. Best-fit modeling produced the final model, testing the 
four elements of SMS. These questions produced a model resulting in a good model fit. 
The combination of modified HRT questions published by Vogus and Sutcliffe 
(2007), the SEP-PA SMS questions plus two demographic questions created the 35 
questions comprising the Organizational Safety Attribute Awareness Survey. Care was 
taken to keep the time required to complete the survey to between 12 and 16 minutes to 
maximize survey-completion rates. Identical surveys were sent electronically to two 
separate groups and were available for 3 weeks. The total sample size was of 154 
participants (60 commercial space industry subjects and 94 airline industry subjects). 
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Comparisons of individual mean values were conducted between groups, as well as 
comparisons of the combined data. A group-acceptance value of 4.0 was used to indicate 
overall recognition of SMS or HRT elements. 
Safety Management System Theory 
A comparison of mean values for SMS attributes was conducted between subjects 
from commercial space and airline groups. An independent t-test was used to compare 
the average mean values between the two groups. Safety assurance results indicated that 
statistically significant differences existed between the mean values of the groups. Safety 
policy, safety risk management, and promotion did not indicate differences between the 
groups. Overall, the mean values for the two groups had similarities above the 
preestablished acceptance level of 4.00. These results suggested that the surveyed 
commercial space respondents had levels of recognition of SMS elements. Future 
implications may include additional focused SMS attribute surveys in specific 
commercial space companies to streamline the adoption of an SMS as the formal safety 
protocol. 
High Reliability Theory 
Mean value comparison was conducted between airlines and commercial space 
organizations on understanding of HRT attributes. Independent t-tests were conducted to 
compare the averaged mean values for HRT between the groups. Results indicated that 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to the operation had 
statistically significant differences in mean values between members of the two groups. 
However, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise did not show a statistically 
significant difference in mean values. 
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The mean values for HRT elements surveyed in both groups had values above the 
established acceptance level of 4.00. This result suggested some level of 
acknowledgment for HRT concepts had taken place in organizations, determined during 
surveying. The members of the airline group had four elements (preoccupation with 
failure, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise) 
that showed understanding at a level above 5.0. One measure, commitment to resilience, 
showed the highest overall universal acknowledgment in the group. Results suggested 
that HRT principles exist among airline employees working in an SMS environment. 
Demographic Questions 
One-way ANOVA testing was conducted to determine whether time in the 
industry or the self-identified management role had a statistically significant impact on 
the dependent SMS variables of safety policy, SRM, safety assurance, and safety 
promotion and the HRT variables of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, 
sensitivity to the operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. No 
statistically significant differences emerged in SMS attributes for the two independent 
variables. 
However, statistically significant differences did emerge in HRT variables related 
to the management role in the organization. Results indicated that the HRT element of 
reluctance to simplify was statistically significantly different between first-level 
managers and those in nonsupervisory roles. Additionally, sensitivity to the operations 
was also statistically significantly different between senior managers and those in 
nonsupervisory roles. This outcome suggested that higher level managers were more 
aware of HRT attributes than were nonsupervisory respondents. 
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Limitations 
The methodology for this study provided several limitations. The first was survey 
testing time for the pilot study. The survey was conducted during the holiday season in 
December when many student pilot instructors were away. Although the test was 
distributed electronically with a link to take the test, the timing of the survey may have 
affected the number of responses. The main pilot-test groups were student instructors at a 
collegiate flight school and academic research center. These groups received multiple 
survey requests throughout the year, creating a potential survey-fatigue situation. 
The ESMM is limited in that it provides a single moment in time without the 
ability to adjust for changes. The study was designed to compare two groups. Testing 
groups from two different industries for the understanding of unfamiliar theories may 
have been a limiting factor. 
Testing two groups on aspects of HRT may not have yielded the strongest 
comparison for the airline group. It is conceivable that neither group was familiar with or 
recognized HRT attributes. That said, the calculated mean value results indicated a 
possible baseline understanding of most concepts. 
Future Research 
This study attempted to set benchmarks to detect attributes of SMST in the 
commercial space industry and to create a foundation on which to build. Furthermore, 
this study sought to establish a level of recognition of HRT attributes in the airline 
industry. The commercial space industry appears to be expanding with new technologies, 
missions, and companies entering the industry. The advent of space tourism may increase 
launch rates to the highest levels seen to date. Currently, airline-safety levels are at an all-
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time high because of the hard work of the FAA and airlines to maintain high safety 
levels. Constant vigilance on the part of operators and the FAA is critical to keeping these 
levels. This alertness will be necessary for the FAA/AST and commercial space as the 
growth in the industry continues. Future studies should include the FAA/AST as a 
research partner, forging a path for increased numbers of survey participants. Such a 
partnership may offer opportunities for entire organizations to participate in future studies 
building on this research. 
Future research studies may include direct comparisons in multiple commercial 
space companies to determine overall organizational understandings of SMST. Using 
larger survey groups (commercial space and airlines) may yield a deeper understanding 
of how companies recognize SMST attributes. A triangulated or explanatory mixed-
method study would expand on the results of this research. 
A longitudinal study may follow this HRT research. A time period with the 
introduction of HRT elements followed by future testing may determine enhanced HRT 
awareness in airline groups. Measuring understanding of the HRT over time in an SMS 
environment may identify specific HRT elements that would help increase the current 
safety culture and structure. Focusing on additional HRT questions in addition to the use 
of the Mindfulness Organizing Scale may provide enriched reaction information. 
Enhanced data may come from testing at an entire organization. Institution wide testing 
of HRT in airlines and commercial space companies will offer detailed statistical data to 
formulate any augmentations to existing safety procedures and practices and enhance 
overall safety in the airline industry. 
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Summary 
It was the intent of this research study to augment the collection of literature on 
SMST. The Delphi group output of the SMS attribute-based questions created a survey 
instrument targeted at uncovering understanding of SMS elements in commercial space 
organizations. The testing validated the survey. The results further suggested 
effectiveness in discerning whether the attributes exist organically in an organization. The 
consequences of this study furthers the discussion on SMST. 
The fundamental understanding of how members of a group recognize additional 
safety theories will allow the management, as well as the FAA/AST, to suggest 
amplifications to any current safety structure in the future. The FAA/AST has no 
proposed SMS adoption timeline for commercial space companies to date. These data 
may help foster a clearer understanding of SMST among commercial space and offer a 
means to more quickly institute the program. The FAA is a well-established advocate of 
the principles of SMS. A universal understanding of how an organization’s members 
comprehend the attributes may be important for the company and the FAA/AST in the 
future. An industry-standard safety-platform protocol and measurement matrix will allow 
for parallel assessments between companies. A common industrywide means of 
measuring safety may also foster increased collaborations in the industry. 
Additionally, this study added an understanding of how HRT attributes may 
augment existing formal safety structures in the airline industry. The knowledge of the 
characteristics of HRT may offer airlines support for and amplification of existing safety 
protocols. Safety is a living, growing, evolving concept that demands constant 
reevaluation in companies. The tools provided by HRT may augment existing SMS 
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Safety Management System Elements 
Table A1 
Safety Management System Elements 
Safety Policy—Establishes senior management’s 
commitment to continually improve safety; defines 
the methods, processes, and organizational structure 
needed to meet safety goals. 
• Establishes management commitment to 
safety performance through SMS 
• Establishes clear safety objectives and 
commitment to manage to those objectives 
• Defines methods, processes, and 
organizational structure needed to meet safety goals 
• Establishes transparency in management of 
safety 
o Fully documented policy and processes 
o Employee reporting and resolution system 
o Accountability of management and 
employees 
• Builds upon the processes and procedures 
that already exit 
• Facilitates cross-organizational 
communication and cooperation 
Safety Risk Management (SRM) — Determines the 
need for, and adequacy of, new or revised risk 
controls based on the assessment of acceptable risk. 
 
• A formal process within the SMS composed 
of: 
o Describing the system 
o Identifying the hazards 
o Assessing the risk 
o Analyzing the risk 
o Controlling the risk 
• The SRM process may be embedded in the 
processes used to provide the product/service 
Safety Assurance (SA) - Evaluates the continued 
effectiveness 
• SMS process management functions that 
systematically provide confidence that organizational 
outputs meet or exceed safety requirements 
• AVS SMS has a dual safety assurance focus: 
o AVS organizations 
o Product/service providers 
• Ensures compliance with SMS requirements 
and FAA orders, standards, policies, and directives 
o Information Acquisition 
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§ Audits and evaluations 
§ Employee reporting 
o Data Analysis 
o System Assessment 
o Provides insight and analysis regarding 
methods/opportunities for improving safety and 
minimizing risk 
o Existing assurance functions will continue to 
evaluate and improve service 
Safety Promotion - Includes training, 
communication, and other actions to create a 
positive safety culture within all levels of the 
workforce 
• Safety promotion activities within the SMS 
framework include: 
• Providing SMS training 
• Advocating/strengthening a positive safety 
culture 
• System and safety communication and 
awareness 
• Matching competency requirements to system 
requirements 
• Disseminating safety lessons learned. 
Everyone has a role in promoting safety 
Note. From Safety Management System for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations Certificate 










Safety Management System Questions Factor Matrix 
Table C1 


























Note. Extraction method: Principal axis factoring, 1 factor extracted. 3 iterations required, P =Policy, SRM 
= Safety Risk Management, SA = Safety Assurance, SP = Safety Promotion. 
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Appendix D 
Survey Invitation Letter 
 
  
Facebook groups/LinkedIn/Direct message/email/text/personal communications 
Commercial Space Companies/individuals WITHOUT SMS - 2 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY ATTRIBUTE AWARENESS SURVEY 
 
Hello, my name is Brian Teske, I am a Ph.D. candidate in (Space Studies/Aviation) at the 
University of North Dakota Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences. This letter is an invitation to 
participate in my dissertation research. My research deals with determining whether safety 
management system attributes and mindfulness/high reliability theory attributes can be detected 
using this survey. Additionally, my research will determine whether time and role will have a 
relationship in the outcome.   
 
Here is the link to the anonymous survey. Please feel free to forward to your colleagues. Thank 
you.  https://und.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0D62InHsXWdxQQR 
 
Your frank answers will help me to determine the relationships between position in the company, 
time in industry, safety management system and high reliability attributes in aerospace 
organizations. This information will help me to craft potential safety protocol changes for 
commercial space and aviation companies.   
 
If you wish further information, please contact me at brian.teske@und.edu, or you may contact 
Dr. Jim Casler at Casler@space.edu. 
 







University of North Dakota 











Organizational Safety Attribute Awareness Survey 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY ATTRIBUTES AWARENESS SURVEY 1 and 2 
D1 Years of experience in your industry 
o 0 to 5 years 
o 5 to 10 years 
o 10 to 15 years 
o Over 15 years 
 
D2 Your primary role in the organization 
o Nonsupervisor (operations, support, administrative, staff, ...) 
o First-level supervisor (responsible for a small group) 
o Manager (manages at least one subordinate level of managers) 
o Senior Manager (responsible for controlling and overseeing the 
organization) 
PF1 The organization has a good roadmap of each other’s talents and skills 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
PF2 We spend time identifying activities we do not want to go wrong 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
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o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
RS1 We discuss alternatives as to how to go about our normal work activities 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SO2 We have a good “map” of each person’s talents and skills 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SO2 We discuss our unique skills with each other so that we know who has relevant 
specialized skills and knowledge 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
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o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
CR1 We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
CR2 When errors happen, we discuss how we could have prevented them 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
DE1 When attempting to resolve a problem, we take advantage of the unique skills of our 
colleagues 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
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o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
DE2 When a crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our collective expertise to attempt to resolve it 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
P2 There is a top-level management person who is ultimately responsible and 
accountable for safety and has the necessary authority over all resources to make risk-
based decisions related to the organization’s activities (accountable executive). 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
 
P3 There is a qualified and well-trained safety professional who manages the 
organization’s safety program coordinates the system safety processes, and has direct 
reporting to the accountable executive. 
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o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
P5 Procedures in the safety plan are documented, communicated, and implemented in the 
organization. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
P5.1 Processes in the safety plan are documented and known throughout the organization. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
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P6 Procedures exist within the organization to manage and respond to adverse safety 
events such as accidents, incidents, and operational emergencies. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP8 There are documented and clearly defined expectations of safety accountability for 
all personnel at every level within the organization. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SRM1 Processes are clearly defined to ensure that activities or conditions that can result 
in death, injuries, equipment damage, or adverse operational outputs are identified and 
documented. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
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o Strongly agree 
SRM2 Processes are clearly defined to ensure a safety risk assessment is accomplished 
for all identified hazards. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SRM3 Processes are defined to ensure that safety controls are applied to mitigate 
identified risks to the lowest acceptable level. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SRM4 Effective controls are applied to those risks that are classified as unacceptable as 
part of hazard identification and risk mitigation in the organization. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
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o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SRM5 A non-punitive (may be anonymous) reporting system for safety issues is 
established and available for all employees. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA1 The organization has an effective and documented system to measure the 
effectiveness of risk controls and safety performance. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA2 Clear evidence exists showing the organization continuously monitors operational 
data to determine and document compliance to established risk controls (Data includes 
products and services received from contractors, safety reports, and employee safety 
feedback). 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
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o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA3 Clear evidence exists showing clear, relevant system safety outputs are generated 
regularly, thoroughly reviewed, and incorporated into policies, procedures, and processes 
by top management. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA6 Clear evidence exists showing auditors possess appropriate professional 
qualifications and are independent of any processes or work evaluated. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA7 Clear evidence exists showing that procedures are clearly defined, documented, 
communicated, and implemented to collect safety data (including investigating incidents 
and accidents). 
o Strongly disagree 
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o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA7.1 Clear evidence exists showing that procedures are clearly defined, documented, 
and communicated to collect instances of regulatory non-compliance, and to identify 
potential new hazards or risk-control failures. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA8 Clear evidence exists that shows a process for proactive hazard identification. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SA9 Clear evidence exists that shows a process for predictive hazard identification. 
o Strongly disagree 
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o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP1 Senior management’s commitment to safety, which includes sustaining a positive 
safety culture, is recognized by all personnel and documented. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP2.2 Clear documentation exists that defines the safety training processes in place to 
ensure that all personnel are properly trained. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP3 Clear documentation exists, demonstrating that all personnel are appropriately well 
trained to perform their duties related to the safety system. (This includes the scope of 
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training with required competencies and responsibilities in the safety system. 
Additionally, initial and periodic safety system training for all employees is clearly 
outlined, scheduled, and performed). 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP5 Clear evidence exists demonstrating an appropriate safety system recurrent training 
is completed for all employees. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
SP6 Clear documentation exists that lists the communications of safety system outputs 
throughout the organization, the rationale behind controls, and preventative or corrective 
actions, including oversight information. 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat agree 
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o Agree 
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Appendix I 
Max Likelihood Estimates Results for the SMS Variables 
 
Figure I1. Confirmatory factor analysis factor loading for safety policy. 
 
 




Figure I3. Confirmatory factor analysis factor loading for safety assurance. 
 
 
Figure I4. Confirmatory factor analysis factor loading for safety promotion. 
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